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TRENDLINES:
COURT DECISIONS, PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, AND THEIR LIKELY IMPACT
ON BINATIONAL SAME-SEX FAMILIES
Jay Strozdas*
Family is a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy. The United States
grants green cards to every immigrant who is validly married to a U.S.
citizen—unless the marriage is to someone of the same sex. The Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) denies federal recognition of so-called samesex marriages. Recent social, political, judicial, and legislative trends
suggest the eventual abrogation of DOMA. Even so, sponsorship for
same-sex couples is not automatic and will ultimately depend on how
DOMA’s demise is achieved. This Article illuminates a clear path for
same-sex binational couples to receive equal immigration benefits in a
post-DOMA world. However, if DOMA remains law, same-sex
binational couples must turn toward comprehensive immigration
reform. The Uniting American Families Act is a proposed piece of
legislation that provides a sponsorship route that is unaffected by
DOMA, but its requirements may prove difficult for same-sex binational
families to satisfy. Thus, for the more than 36,000 same-sex binational
couples who face decisions like separation or exile, an end of DOMA is
the preferred—but not exclusive—solution for granting sponsorship
rights to all families.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Saint Louis
University. I would like to extend immense gratitude to Kathleen Kim, Professor of Law at
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, and Andrew Lichtenstein for guiding this whole issue. A very
special thanks to Andrew Kazakes, whose diligent editing and thoughtful insights made this
Article possible. I also thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. This
Article is dedicated to the thousands of couples who are currently separated because of
discriminatory laws.
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We are separated, and without each other. . . . We just want
to be together, that’s all. No harm in that.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Family is a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy. In 2009,
more than two-thirds of all green cards were obtained through
family-based immigration.2 However, many families—those of gays
and lesbians3—are excluded from that count. Gays and lesbians are
ineligible to sponsor their foreign spouses or partners for familybased immigration, even if they are legally married.4 This leaves
approximately thirty-six thousand same-sex binational couples living
in the United States5 in a state of immigration limbo.
At first, many same-sex couples are able to stay together
through nonimmigrant visas for tourists or students. But when the
nonimmigrant visas expire, the options remaining are bleak: violate
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUAL., FAMILY, UNVALUED:
DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S.
LAW 9 (2006) [hereinafter FAMILY UNVALUED] (quoting E-mail from Sandra (last name withheld
at her request) to Immigration Equal. (Oct. 29, 2005)), available at http://www.hrc.org/
documents/FamilyUnvalued.pdf.
2. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
18 tbl.6 (2009) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK], available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf (reporting that 747,413 persons
obtained legal permanent residence as immediate relatives or through family-sponsored
preference categories out of the 1,130,818 total obtained in 2009). The number of family
members receiving green cards may be higher than statistics indicate because spouses and
children often immigrate as “derivatives” through a primary alien’s employment-based visa. See
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 201(f)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(4) (2006). Derivative
family members are counted against the employment-based immigration quota. See id.; infra Part
II.A.
3. This Article uses the term “gay and lesbian” to refer to people who identify as gay,
lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer. The term is used for simplicity and does not imply that
other identities are not similarly discriminated against.
4. This is because the Defense of Marriage Act—which prevents federal recognition of
marriages between same-sex couples, whether the marriage is performed in the United States or
abroad—controls the INA. See Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How
Immigration Law Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
455, 458–60 (2008) (discussing DOMA’s effect on immigration law and the INA).
5. GARY J. GATES, BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN CENSUS 2000: A
DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 1 (2005), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/Williamsinstitute/
publications/Binational_Report.pdf (reporting 35,820 same-sex binational couples based on the
2000 Census). Many believe that the 2000 census undercounted same-sex binational couples by
10 to 50 percent. See Teresa Watanabe, Line in Sand for Same-Sex Couples: Unlike a
Heterosexual Spouse, a Gay U.S. Citizen Cannot Sponsor His or Her Noncitizen Partner for a
Green Card, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at B1.
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the law, separate, or live in exile.6 John Beddingfield and Erwin de
Leon are one family facing this decision.7 After twelve years
together, they were recently legally married in Washington, D.C.8
However, when de Leon’s student visa expires, he will be forced to
become one of the millions of unauthorized immigrants9 in the
United States.10 Another option is exile. J.W. Lown, once the mayor
of a town in West Texas, was forced to move to Mexico to remain
together with a Mexican citizen with whom he fell in love, thus
abandoning a home, a ranch, and a promising political career.11 As he
put it, “It wasn’t a decision that any U.S. citizen should have to
make.”12
Many of these decisions affect not just the citizen and his or her
partner, but children as well. Nearly half of the binational same-sex
couples in the United States have children.13 Sandra from North
Carolina was raising children with her Hungarian partner but now
lives alone in the United States after her partner and children were
forced to leave.14 Other children may remain in the United States
while one of their parents is forced to leave. Shirley Tan, an asylum
seeker, is raising two twelve-year-old boys with her lesbian partner
of twenty years, Jay Mercado.15 While Mercado became nationalized,

6. Employment-based visas are a possibility but are difficult to obtain as there are quotas
and most people who gain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status through employment visas are
already working in the United States at the time of their application. INA § 201(d), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(d); Daniel Walfish, Note, Student Visas and the Illogic of the Intent Requirement, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 473, 474 n.7 (2003).
7. Shankar Vedantam, Gay Couples Seeking Immigration Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2010, at A13.
8. Id.
9. Following leading immigration scholars, this Article employs the phrase “unauthorized”
as a more neutral term than “illegal” or “undocumented.” This is not to say that the law is
irrelevant, but it is the present state of the law itself that excludes people like de Leon. See
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59
DUKE L.J. 1723, 1725 n.2 (2010).
10. Vedantam, supra note 7.
11. Michelle Roberts, Gay Couples Forced to Flee U.S. over Immigration Law, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 10, 2009, 4:12 PM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6469222.html.
12. Id.
13. GATES, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that approximately 46 percent of binational same-sex
couples have children under age eighteen living with them in their home).
14. FAMILY UNVALUED, supra note 1, at 9.
15. Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2009, at A19.
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Tan’s asylum application was denied.16 With no options for family
sponsorship as a lesbian couple, Tan only remains in the United
States temporarily.17
Current trends in federal court cases and targeted legislation
may offer a route to permanent unification for families like Tan’s.18
Because marriage rights confer immigration rights in the United
States, the current debate over so-called same-sex marriage19 will
shape family-based immigration for same-sex couples. Without a
change in marriage law, Congress could craft legislation—whether
standing alone or as part of comprehensive immigration reform—to
expand family unification to include same-sex couples.
This Article explores three emerging developments that may
lead to equal immigration benefits for same-sex binational couples:
(1) federal court challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the federal law that limits the definition of marriage to
opposite-sex couples; (2) Perry v. Schwarzenegger,20 a federal court
case challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8, California’s
ban on same-sex marriage; and (3) the Uniting American Families
Act (UAFA), proposed legislation that would carve out a nonmarriage-based sponsorship exception for same-sex binational
couples. Each of these developments presents a possible solution for
families like Tan’s and de Leon’s to avoid separation, exile, or
breaking the law. However, each potential solution also presents its
own obstacles for same-sex binational couples. This Article will
discuss and shed light on these obstacles and present resolutions to
illuminate clearer paths to immigration equality—so all families can
remain together.

16. Id.
17. Tan has avoided deportation only because Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a private
bill on Tan’s behalf. Id. Congress can pass a private bill creating an exception to public law for
one individual or a specified group of individuals. For more information on private bills see
Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87 (2007).
18. For more stories of families facing separation, see STOP THE DEPORTATIONS: THE
DOMA PROJECT, http://stopthedeportations.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
19. This Article avoids referring to the commonly used “same-sex marriage” phrase because
that term invokes a feeling of a special right. Phrases such as “marriage between individuals of
the same sex” more appropriately recognize that same-sex couples merely desire to be included in
the same institution that opposite-sex couples are in.
20. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

TRENDLINES

Summer 2011]

1345

Part II explains family unification under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)21 and briefly details the historical and
continuing legal inequality for gays and lesbians under the Act.
Part III considers recent federal challenges to DOMA and evaluates
the arguments in light of a later challenge to DOMA, as applied to
immigration. Part IV focuses on the Perry v. Schwarzenegger
litigation and its potential to yield nationwide marriage equality or at
least to provide an additional route to attack DOMA. Part V explains
the obstacles remaining even if DOMA is overturned and how samesex binational couples can overcome them. Part VI discusses the
UAFA and outlines the thorny interpretation and implementation
issues that this legislation presents. Part VII concludes.
II. IMMIGRATION INEQUALITY
FOR SAME-SEX FAMILIES
For most of the twentieth century, U.S. immigration law
categorically denied entry to gays and lesbians.22 While foreign gays
and lesbians are now allowed to enter the United States,23 they are
inhibited from creating family relationships with citizens—as federal
law continues to deny family-based immigration to same-sex
couples.
A. Family-Based Immigration
24

For an alien to enter the U.S. lawfully, he or she must obtain an
appropriate visa. A nonimmigrant visa25 enables an alien to
21. The INA was created in 1952 by the McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414.
Prior to the INA, immigration law was not organized in one statutory location. Though the INA
stands alone as a body of law, it is also contained in section 8 of the United States Code.
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel
=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM
10000045f3d6a1RCRD (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
22. See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text.
23. Exclusionary provisions of the INA were repealed in 1990, allowing foreign gays and
lesbians to travel to the United States as freely as other noncitizens could. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
24. The term “alien” is chosen over more neutral terms such as “foreign national” to stay
consistent with the statutory text. Further, the term “foreign national” includes legal permanent
residents in the United States since legal permanent residents are eligible to sponsor other foreign
nationals for family-based immigration; the term “alien” more clearly distinguishes the two
groups.
25. There is no formal definition of the term “nonimmigrant” other than to generically
describe an alien in a nonimmigrant class. 2 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN
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temporarily stay in the United States as a tourist,26 student,27 or
temporary worker.28 If an alien intends to stay permanently in the
United States as an immigrant,29 he or she must become a lawful
permanent resident (LPR) by obtaining a permanent residence card,
commonly known as a green card.30 Typically, an alien obtains a
green card through sponsorship by a U.S. citizen, an LPR, or an
employer.31 The most common route to permanent-resident status is
family-based immigration,32 which entails a U.S. citizen or LPR
sponsoring a foreign family member.
An alien obtains family-based permanent residence either as an
“immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen or through one of the so-called
family-sponsored preference categories. Immediate relatives include
only spouses, minor children, and parents.33 The family-sponsored
preference categories are as follows: (1) unmarried sons and
daughters of citizens, (2) spouses and unmarried children of LPRs,
(3) married sons and daughters of citizens, and (4) brothers and
sisters of citizens.34 The major difference between the immediate
relative classification and the family-sponsored preference categories
is that no quotas apply to aliens classified as immediate relatives.35
The wait period for an immediate relative is only the processing time
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 12.03[1][a], at 12–14 to –18 (Matthew
Bender ed., rev. ed. 2010).
26. A tourist visa is a “B-1” temporary visitor for pleasure visa. INA § 101(a)(15)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (2006).
27. A student visa is an “F-1” student visa. INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(F)(i).
28. A temporary worker visa is a “B-2” temporary visitor for business visa. INA
§ 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B).
29. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (“The term ‘immigrant’ means every alien
except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens . . . .”).
30. Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=ae8
53ad15c673210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=ae853ad15c673210VgnVCM
100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 29, 2011).
31. Visa Types for Immigrants, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/
types/types_1326.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). Although there are other ways, such as the
diversity lottery or asylum. Id.
32. See IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 18 tbl.6.
33. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). A parent is only considered an
immediate relative if the sponsoring citizen is over age twenty-one. Id.
34. INA § 203(a)(1)–(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4).
35. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (listing aliens who are not subject to direct numerical
limitations).
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for a visa,36 unlike the four-year minimum37 wait for the millions of
prospective immigrants subject to preference category quotas.38
Unsurprisingly, “immediate relatives” is the most highly favored
immigration classification, receiving half of all green cards issued.39
Spouses compose by far the largest group within the immediate
relative classification and within family-based immigration
generally.40 Yet the INA never defines the terms “spouse,”
“husband,” or “wife.”41 Thus, the general rule is that “[t]he validity
of a marriage ordinarily is judged by the law of the place where it is
celebrated.”42 Married couples must follow the law in the jurisdiction
where they were married and provide to immigration officials
documentation proving their marriage.43 This is true whether the
marriage was performed in a foreign country or within the United
States.44 The INA even recognizes common-law marriages if they are
valid where the couple lived together.45
36. Estimated wait times for processing depends on the embassy or consulate. For further
information consult Visa Wait Times—for Interview Appointments and Processing,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/wait/wait_4638.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2011).
37. STUART ANDERSON, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, FAMILY IMMIGRATION: THE
LONG WAIT TO IMMIGRATE 1–2 (2010), available at http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/
Publications/NFAP_Policy_Brief_Family_Immigration.pdf.
38. Reuniting Families Act, CONGRESSMAN MIKE HONDA, http://honda.house.gov/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=76 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(“There are currently 5.8 million people in the family immigration backlog waiting
unconscionable periods of time to reunite with their family members.”).
39. IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 18 tbl.6 (reporting that in 2009, immediate
relatives received 535,554 out of the 1,130,818 total green cards issued).
40. Nearly 30 percent of all green cards obtained in 2009 were for spouses of U.S. citizens,
who made up more than half of all “immediate relatives.” Id. Spouses of LPRs make up the
largest portion of visa recipients under the family-sponsored preference categories. Id.
41. The closest that the INA comes is by specifying that the terms do not include so-called
proxy marriages. INA § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006) (“The term ‘spouse’, ‘wife’,
or ‘husband’ do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other,
unless the marriage shall have been consummated.”).
42. 3 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 36.02[2][a], at 36–5.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.1, note N1.1(c) (2010)
[hereinafter FAM: VISAS 40.1], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
86920.pdf.
44. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY § A, at 327 (6th ed. 2008).
45. Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications
for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 562
(2010). Normally, the only narrow exceptions to the general rule of validity where performed are
for proxy marriages and marriages deemed to conflict with public policy. ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
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Marriage triggers numerous benefits for aliens and their spouses.
In addition to avoiding the quota system, marriage renders an alien
eligible to enter the United States as a dependent of another foreign
national who is a visa holder.46 Marriage can also be used as an
exception to or a waiver of deportability and inadmissibility.47 The
INA’s high regard for marriage even extends to those who are
unmarried but intend to marry. A K-1 visa is available for the fiancé
of a U.S. citizen,48 provided the couple met in the previous two years
and is able to get married within ninety days of the fiancé’s
immigration.49 None of those benefits are available to gays and
lesbians. Immigration laws, in conjunction with DOMA, deny gays
and lesbians the privilege of sponsoring their spouses for familybased immigration and thus perpetuate a long history of
discrimination.
B. Immigration Inequality: Past and Present
Explicit discrimination against gays and lesbians for
immigration purposes began with a ban against entry in the
Immigration Act of 1917.50 Congress repealed and replaced the 1917
Act with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, but the
exclusion of gays and lesbians continued because the INA
considered gays and lesbians “afflicted with psychopathic
personality . . . or a mental defect.”51 If a prospective entrant was
suspected to be gay or lesbian, he or she was referred to a Public
Health Service (PHS) official to diagnose the personality or defect.52
Upon diagnosis, the person was denied entry. In 1962, the Ninth
Circuit rejected inclusion of homosexuality as a “psychopathic
supra note 44, at 327. DOMA has become another large exception. See infra text accompanying
notes 65–67.
46. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii) (providing
nonimmigrant visa status for the spouses of student visa holders).
47. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (providing a waiver to
inadmissibility due to unlawful presence in the United States to prevent “extreme hardship” to the
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse of the foreign national).
48. INA § 101(a)(15)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i).
49. INA § 214(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1).
50. Lena Ayoub & Shin-Ming Wong, Separated and Unequal, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
559, 563 (2006).
51. Id. (quoting INA, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (2006))).
52. Id. at 564.
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personality” on vagueness grounds.53 Almost immediately, Congress
responded by amending the Act to exclude aliens afflicted with
“‘sexual deviation’—i.e., homosexuals.”54 In 1967, the U.S. Supreme
Court held there was clear congressional intent “to exclude from
entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts.”55
However, in 1979 the PHS informed the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)56 that it would no longer diagnose gays
and lesbians as having psychopathic personalities, following the
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to remove
homosexuality from its official list of disorders.57 The Department of
Justice (DOJ) stated that it would still continue to exclude gays and
lesbians, but that it would now rely solely on the alien’s voluntary
admission that he or she was gay or lesbian.58 The federal courts split
on the legality of the continued exclusion of gays and lesbians.59
Congress resolved this conflict by eliminating the exclusionary
language with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990.60
Although gays and lesbians are no longer categorically barred
from entering the United States, they are still unable to sponsor
spouses through family-based immigration. This issue first emerged
in 1980, when Richard Adams and Anthony Sullivan received a
marriage license in Colorado and Adams petitioned the INS to

53. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 374
U.S. 449 (1963).
54. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 565.
55. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967).
56. The INS is a former U.S. agency charged with handling legal and illegal immigration
that is now part of several agencies in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
57. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 565 (citing Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public
Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 779 (1993) and Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec’y
for Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, and Surgeon Gen. to William Foege and
George Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979)).
58. Id.
59. Compare Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling that homosexuals
could not be excluded without certification from PHS), with In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1451
(5th Cir. 1983) (denying petitioner naturalization because he was homosexual even though no
PHS certification was obtained).
60. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 566. In theory, gay men remain vulnerable to
deportation and exclusion based upon sodomy convictions, which fall under “crime[s] involving
moral turpitude.” INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). However, it is
unlikely that deportation or exclusion based on such grounds would be sustained after the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down antisodomy statutes as unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying
note 76.
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classify Sullivan as his spouse for immigration purposes.61 The INS
denied the petition, finding that the couple “failed to establish that a
bona fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots.”62 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the INS denial in Adams v. Howerton, finding
that Congress intended the term “spouse” to refer to members of
opposite-sex couples and that it was within Congress’s plenary
power to limit access to immigration benefits.63
While most of the reasoning that the Adams court employed is
no longer tenable,64 Congress implicitly affirmed Adams when it
passed DOMA on September 10, 1996.65 DOMA has two important
parts: Section 3 defines the terms “marriage” and “spouse” for all
federal purposes, and Section 2 affirms the states’ power to refuse to
recognize marriages that were performed in other states.66 According
to Section 3, “[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is husband
or a wife.”67 Therefore, no same-sex marriages are recognized for
federal purposes.
Since the INA is a federal law, any reference that it makes to the
term spouse incorporates the DOMA definition. Specifically, DOMA
supplants the general INA rule for marriage recognition—a marriage
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.68 At the time of DOMA’s
passage in 1996, it did not affect any same-sex binational couples

61. Adam Francoeur, The Enemy Within: Construction of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy
and the Homoterrorist Threat, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 354–55 (2007). Colorado did not
generally allow marriage between individuals of the same sex at the time. Adams and Sullivan
were able to persuade their local county clerk to issue a marriage license in order, hopefully, to
keep Sullivan in the United States. Id. at 354.
62. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 139 (2d ed.
1997) (quoting a letter from INS to Anthony Sullivan, Nov. 24, 1975).
63. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039–41 (9th Cir. 1982).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 243–246.
65. Francoeur, supra note 61, at 356.
66. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.”).
67. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
68. Infra note 226 and accompanying text.
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because no state or country performed same-sex marriages.69 But this
is no longer the case.70 Even with a valid marriage, like the one
between de Leon and Beddingfield, DOMA’s modification of the
INA excludes same-sex couples from immigration benefits solely
based on their sex without regard to the substance of their
relationships. For example, if de Leon were to have a sex change
operation, the INA would likely recognize the marriage.71 Gay and
lesbian aliens may no longer be denied categorically from entering
the United States, but they are still effectively barred from creating
family relationships with citizens of the same sex.
C. Recent Developments in Gay and Lesbian Rights
While DOMA is still law, recent court cases and social
developments demonstrate a trend toward expanding rights for gays
and lesbians. In 1996, the same year that DOMA passed, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans72 overturned a Colorado
constitutional amendment designed to prevent gays and lesbians
from receiving any legal protection through local and state antidiscrimination laws or even state courts. The Supreme Court found
that the amendment was only explicable as “animus” toward
homosexuals,73 which is not a legitimate government justification,
even under deferential rational basis review.74 Thus, the Colorado
amendment violated the equal protection rights that are guaranteed

69. In 2001, the Netherlands became the first nation to grant marriages for same-sex couples.
See Same-Sex Marriage Around the World: From Criminal Prosecutions to Legal Unions, CBC
NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/05/26/f-same-sex-timeline.html (last updated Aug.
2010) [hereinafter Marriage Around the World].
70. See infra text accompanying note 77.
71. For a discussion of the INA’s recognition of a marriage involving a transsexual person,
see infra note 234 and accompanying text.
72. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
73. Id. at 632.
74. Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny. The standard is very deferential
and the law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The
burden of proof is on the challenger. A less deferential basis of review is intermediate scrutiny,
which is applied in gender discrimination claims. The law will be upheld under this standard if it
is substantially related to an important government purpose. The burden of proof rests on the
state. The most demanding level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. This is applied in race
discrimination claims. The government has the burden of proof, and the law will only be upheld if
the government shows that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose. This standard is
usually fatal to the challenged law. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719–20 (3d
ed. 2009).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Then in 2003, the Court in
Lawrence v. Texas76 found that criminalizing private, consensual
homosexual sodomy violated the substantive component of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Since DOMA passed, many states and countries have also
shifted toward allowing gays and lesbians to marry. As this Article
goes to press, there are seven jurisdictions in the United States and
ten nations that perform marriages between individuals of the same
sex.77 Eleven more U.S. states allow some form of civil union or
domestic partnership.78 Public opinion has also shifted dramatically
since the passage of DOMA. The percentage of Americans opposed
to so-called same-sex marriage dropped from 68 percent in 199679 to
roughly 48 percent in 2010.80 Some 2011 polls even show that a slim
majority of Americans now support marriage for same-sex couples.81
These numbers demonstrate that Americans increasingly accept—or
at least support the equal treatment of—same-sex families. As
President Obama stated, “it’s pretty clear where the trendlines are
going.”82 Recognizing this, in February 2011, the President instructed
75. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. The seven jurisdictions are Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, New
York, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. See Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and
Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last updated July 14, 2011) [hereinafter Same Sex Marriage].
Maryland may become the seventh state and eighth jurisdiction. Legislation expanding marriage
to same-sex couples passed the Maryland Senate but stalled in the House of Delegates. Annie
Linskey and Julie Bykowicz, What Future for Same-Sex Marriage?, BALT. SUN, Mar. 13, 2011,
at Local 1A. The ten nations are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden. Marriage Around the World, supra note 69.
78. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77.
79. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, GALLUP
(May 24, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/128291/americans-opposition-gay-marriage-easesslightly.aspx.
80. Gay Marriage Gains More Acceptance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBL’NS (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1755/poll-gay-marriage-gains-acceptance-gays-in-the-military.
81. Sandhya Somashekhar & Peyton Craighill, Poll: Slim Majority Backs Gay Marriage,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2011, at A2 (citing a Post-ABC poll that found that 53 percent of
Americans say so-called gay marriage should be legal). For the first time, a Gallup poll found that
the majority of Americans (53 percent) believe marriages between same-sex individuals should
be legally recognized. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay
Marriage, GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majorityamericans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx.
82. Joe Sudbay, Transcript of Q and A with the President About DADT and Same-sex
Marriage, AMERICABLOG (Oct. 27, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://www.americablog.com/2010/10/
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the Attorney General to stop defending DOMA in a few federal
challenges.83
However, Obama made it clear that DOMA will continue to be
enforced because it is still law—until Congress or a court acts.84
Accordingly, the INA will still not recognize marriages between
same-sex couples. With DOMA remaining law, same-sex binational
families, like de Leon’s or Tan’s, will soon have to choose between
violating the law, separating, or living in exile. This painful choice
could be avoided if DOMA is judicially overturned. Precedent set in
current federal challenges to DOMA, the DOJ’s new stance on
DOMA, and a federal challenge to a “same-sex marriage” ban may
provide the path necessary for same-sex binational couples.
Otherwise, these families will need to turn to immigration-specific
legislation that sidesteps DOMA by granting rights to their families
without invoking the word “marriage.”
III. ENDING DOMA AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION
The largest obstacle in the way of immigration equality for
same-sex binational couples is DOMA.85 One solution is a legislative
repeal of DOMA, though that is unlikely in the 112th Congress. The
other path to equality is a judicial overturning of DOMA, which
became more probable after the recent decisions in Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management86 and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (“Mass. v. HHS”),87 and the DOJ’s new
stance on sexual-orientation classifications. This part analyzes both

transcript-of-q-and-with-president.html. Vice President Biden echoed this outlook; on the heels of
the Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Tell repeal, Biden remarked that a national consensus on gay marriage is
“an inevitability.” Stephanie Samuel, DOMA Repeal Not Likely to Happen Soon Despite Biden’s
Remarks, CHRISTIAN POST (Dec. 27, 2010, 3:39 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/article/
20101227/doma-repeal-not-likely-to-happen-soon-despite-bidens-remarks/.
83. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/
24marriage.html.
84. Id.
85. As explained above, binational same-sex couples are precluded from family-based
sponsorship because for all federal purposes DOMA defines marriage as a union between only a
man and a woman. See supra text accompanying note 67.
86. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
87. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
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holdings and how same-sex binational couples can exploit them to
receive family-based immigration benefits.
A. Legislative Repeal of DOMA:
Far-Reaching but Unlikely
The possibility of a legislative repeal of DOMA may be slight,
but it would provide the clearest path to immigration equality for
same-sex couples. Recognizing the inequalities inherent in DOMA
and the large change in public opinion since 1996,88 in 2009 the
House introduced the Respect for Marriage Act—a legislative repeal
of DOMA.89 Beyond its introduction, there was little movement on
the bill.90 Even less movement is likely in the 112th Congress.91 On
the other hand, Vice President Biden predicted—after the repeal of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT)—that the American people would
encourage President Obama to act on the repeal of DOMA as he did
with DADT.92 Then, on the heels of the DOJ’s announcement to no
longer defend DOMA, Democrats in both houses of Congress
introduced repeals of DOMA.93 In July 2011, the Senate held the first
ever hearing on the repeal of DOMA and, as predicted by Biden,
President Obama came out in support of the repeal.94

88. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
89. Representatives Jerrold Nadler, Tammy Baldwin, and Jared Polis introduced the Respect
for Marriage Act on September 15, 2009. H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009).
90. The bill was referred to subcommittee, but there was no hearing on the bill and no sister
bill was introduced in the Senate. Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009–2010)
H.R.3567, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.03567: (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011).
91. Every cosponsor of the Respect for Marriage Act was a Democrat. Id. With the House
shifting to Republican control in the 112th Congress, it is unlikely a Democrat-only sponsored
bill will pass. Alan Silverleib, New Congress Set to Convene with ‘Tough Decisions’ on Tap,
CNN POLITICS (Jan. 5, 2011 11:45 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/05/newcongress-set-to-convene-with-tough-decisions-on-tap/.
92. Samuel, supra note 82. Many thought DADT would not be repealed, but it ultimately
was on December 18, 2010. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Is Repealed by Senate; Bill
Awaits
Obama’s
Signing,
WASH.
POST
(Dec. 19,
2010,
12:10
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/AR2010121801729.html.
With enough political pressure, DOMA may fall as well.
93. Ashby Jones, Dems in Congress Launch Effort to Kill DOMA, WSJ LAW BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/03/16/dems-in-congress-launch-effortto-kill-doma/.
94. David Nakamura, Obama Backs Bill to Repeal Defense of Marriage Act, POSTPOLITICS
(July 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-backs-bill-to-repeal-defense-ofmarriage-act/2011/07/19/gIQA03eQOI_story.html.
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If Congress were to repeal DOMA, same-sex binational couples
would need to look no further than the INA for immigration equality.
Unlike all of the other options for achieving immigration equality,
the repeal of DOMA would not require court action. A congressional
repeal would show the federal government’s clear intent to recognize
that all marriages are valid where they were performed. Same-sex
binational couples would only need to get married before they could
apply for spousal sponsorship under the INA. While conflicting state
policies regarding marriages of same-sex couples may lead to
additional complications, a legislative repeal of DOMA would leave
little federal obstruction to same-sex binational couples’ paths to
immigration equality.95 This assumes that the Respect for Marriage
Act will pass the House and advance beyond a Senate hearing. The
ultimate relief for same-sex binational couples, however, may come
from the courts and not from Congress.
B. Federal Court Finds DOMA Unconstitutional
Federal court challenges to DOMA have so far proven
successful. Massachusetts, for example, is one of seven jurisdictions
that allow same-sex couples to marry,96 but DOMA prevents federal
recognition of those marriages. In response, two separate lawsuits
were filed to challenge DOMA as it applied in Massachusetts.
U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro heard both challenges and, on
July 8, 2010, found DOMA unconstitutional in both cases.97 The
problem for same-sex binational couples is that neither of these cases
directly implicates DOMA’s application to immigration. Same-sex
couples must use any precedent created on the appeal of these two
cases in a subsequent suit either to attack DOMA on its face or, as
applied to immigration, to ultimately achieve equality in familybased immigration.

95. The full analysis of immigration equality in a post-DOMA world is in Part V.
96. See supra note 77.
97. Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples U.S. Rejection of Gay Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/
09marriage.html.
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1. Two Different Constitutional
Theories Lead to Same Result
The first case—Gill v. Office of Personnel Management98—was
filed by the Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD).99
GLAD argued that Section 3 of DOMA100 is unconstitutional because
it denies each plaintiff spousal protection under specific federal
programs.101 Judge Tauro agreed that DOMA, as it applied to the
plaintiffs, was a violation of the equal protection principles embodied
in the Fifth Amendment.102 He found all of the government’s
proposed reasons103 to be without merit, and, thus, inferred that
animus was the only basis for the law.104 Animus is not a legitimate
government interest,105 so Judge Tauro found DOMA
unconstitutional as it applied to the Gill plaintiffs.106
In a companion case, brought by Massachusetts Attorney
General Martha Coakley107—Mass. v. HHS—Judge Tauro again
declared DOMA unconstitutional, though on different grounds.
Coakley argued that the federal government—by passing and
enforcing Section 3 of DOMA—overstepped its authority, thereby
undermining Massachusetts’s efforts to recognize same-sex
marriages.108 Both of Coakley’s constitutional arguments (based,
respectively, on the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause)
were essentially the same—that Congress has intruded into the

98. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
99. Press Release, GLAD, GLAD Files Lawsuit Challenging Denial of Critical Federal
Benefits to Married Same-Sex Couples (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.glad.org/
current/pr-detail/glad-files-lawsuit-challenging-denial-of-critical-federal-benefits-to-marri/.
100. Section 3 defines marriage as only between one man and one woman. See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
101. The specific federal programs at issue in Gill were federal income tax, Social Security,
federal employees’ and retirees’ benefits, and the issuance of passports. Press Release, GLAD,
supra note 99.
102. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77.
103. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
104. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
105. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
106. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
107. See Martin Finucane, Mass. Challenges Federal Defense of Marriage Act, BOS. GLOBE
(July 8, 2009, 3:23 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/07/mass_to_
challen.html.
108. Id.
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exclusive province of states to define marriage.109 Judge Tauro found
that the federal government impermissibly conditioned the receipt of
federal funds on the denial of marriage-based benefits to same-sex
married couples.110 In doing so, DOMA induces Massachusetts to
violate the equal protection rights of its citizens, which is an invalid
use of Congress’ spending power.111 Further, Judge Tauro found that
Massachusetts has the authority to recognize marriages between
individuals of the same sex, so the federal government’s enforcement
of DOMA encroaches on the province of the state, in violation of the
Tenth Amendment.112 Therefore, he ruled DOMA unconstitutional
because it exceeds the scope of Congress’ spending power and
interferes with Massachusetts’s domestic-relations law.
2. Promising Precedent, but Narrow
Gill and Mass. v. HHS are the first cases to successfully
challenge DOMA.113 If upheld, they will create strong precedent for
other challenges to DOMA, but the narrowness of their holdings may
limit any immediate impact on same-sex binational couples. These
cases will not create nationwide marriage equality, though that is
unnecessary for same-sex binational couples to receive immigration
benefits.114 The biggest obstacle for binational same-sex couples after
109. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246 (D.
Mass. 2010).
110. Id. at 248 (“By way of example, the Department of Veterans Affairs informed the
Commonwealth in clear terms that the federal government is entitled to ‘recapture’ millions in
federal grants if and when the Commonwealth opts to bury the same-sex spouse of a veteran in
one of the state veterans cemeteries, a threat which, in essence, would penalize the
Commonwealth for affording same-sex married couples the same benefits as similarly-situated
heterosexual couples that meet the criteria for burial in [federal cemeteries].”).
111. Id. at 248–49.
112. Id. at 253.
113. See Marcia Coyle, Massachusetts Case May Be Key in Gay Marriage Fight, NAT’L L.J.
(Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202433430922&slreturn=
1&hbxlogin=1 (discussing other challenges to DOMA encountering problems in federal court).
114. Both Gill and Mass. v. HHS challenged only Section 3 of DOMA, the definitional
provision, not Section 2, the cross-state nonrecognition provision. See supra notes 66–67 and
accompanying text. In other words, neither case can directly spread marriage equality into states
that choose not to recognize marriages for same-sex couples. GLAD, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DECISIONS IN GILL V. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS V. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnelmanagement/DOMA-FAQ.pdf. It would take a fundamental rights analysis implicated in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger to spread marriage equality nationwide. See infra Part IV.C. Without nationwide
marriage equality, same-sex binational couples will have some complications of marriage
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Gill and Mass. v. HHS is that both cases were as-applied challenges
to Massachusetts and the listed federal benefits. Neither case directly
implicates immigration law. To end DOMA’s discrimination against
same-sex binational couples in the context of the INA, another suit
must be brought to challenge DOMA on its face or as it applies to
immigration.
After Gill and Mass. v. HHS, two new suits were filed
challenging DOMA.115 While the new suits—Windsor v. United
States116 and Pederson v. Office of Personnel Management117—
involve more federal rights than were addressed in Gill,118 there is yet
to be a case listing immigration as one of the federal rights denied
because of DOMA.119 If and when such a case is filed, any precedent
set on appeal in Gill or Mass. v. HHS could shape the case’s
arguments and ultimate outcome.120
C. Precedent on Appeal
Any successful suits that same-sex binational couples file
attacking DOMA on its face or challenging its application in the
immigration context will require an understanding of the legal
arguments at play in Gill or Mass. v. HHS. Any possible precedent
created on the appeal of these two cases will be decided on either
Tenth Amendment or equal protection grounds, or on both.121 While
recognition under the INA. However, in a post-DOMA world, most valid marriages will be
recognized regardless of state recognition. See infra Part V.B.
115. Lisa Keen, Two More DOMA Court Challenges Filed; Five Cases Now Pending, KEEN
NEWS SERV. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.keennewsservice.com/2010/11/09/two-more-domacourt-challenges-filed-five-cases-now-pending/.
116. No. l:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
117. No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010).
118. See Keen, supra note 115; John Schwartz, Gay Couples to Sue over U.S. Marriage Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010 at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/us/
09marriage.html?_r=1.
119. Some gay and lesbian immigration rights groups oppose challenging immigration laws in
court because of the federal government’s plenary power over immigration, which may explain
the hesitation on filing cases in the DOMA context at this point. See Same Sex Marriage,
IMMIGR. EQUALITY, http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=154 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2010).
120. The DOJ’s stance on sexual orientation classifications will also be important in shaping
any future lawsuit.
121. Despite a delay, the DOJ ultimately appealed both of Judge Tauro’s rulings to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although no specific grounds for appeal were given. Denis
Lavoie, Feds Appeal Mass. Rulings Against US Marriage Law, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/10/12/feds_appeal_mass_rulings_
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each has a different probability of success and will create different
legal paths for same-sex binational couples, the likeliest and easiest
argument for same-sex binational couples to build on would be
overturning DOMA based on the animus reasoning in Romer.122
1. Federalism Argument Unlikely to Succeed
The Tenth Amendment argument in Mass. v. HHS is not likely
to be upheld on appeal,123 and it provides little traction for same-sex
couples to attack DOMA. The federal government may indeed
overstep its power by regulating marriage, but the same is not true in
immigration. Constitutional grants and the precedent of the so-called
plenary power clearly give the federal government the ability to
control immigration.124 So affirming will do little to help same-sex
binational couples who are directly challenging immigration laws.
On the other hand, if the federalism argument were upheld on appeal,
it would provide the basis for other states to attack DOMA. The
outcome of a state-by-state approach is unknown, but such a steady
weakening of DOMA could put pressure on Congress to repeal the
Act. Since Judge Tauro’s federalism arguments are self-defeating,125
this Article does not discuss this scenario any further.
against_us_marriage_law. Without a full brief from the DOJ and no date set for appeal, the
ultimate holding of Gill or Mass. v. HHS on appeal is beyond the scope of this Article.
122. One possibility on appeal in the First Circuit is reversal of both the equal protection and
the federalism arguments (Tenth Amendment and exceeding Spending Clause power). This
would leave DOMA intact and provide strong precedent for DOMA’s constitutionality, if it is
attacked in other circuits. Since this option would not provide any path to immigration equality, it
is not further discussed. Same-sex binational couples nonetheless should understand that there is a
strong likelihood of a reversal. For discussion of a reversal see Jack M. Balkin, Be Careful What
You Wish for Department: Federal District Court Strikes Down DOMA, BALKINIZATION (July 8,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/be-careful-what-you-wish-for2010,
6:35
PM),
department.html.
123. See, e.g., id.
124. For an explanation of the plenary power, see infra notes 211–215 and accompanying
text.
125. Judge Tauro argued marriage is distinctly a state law domain, Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 250 (D. Mass. 2010), while also
providing a list of federal programs that regulate marriage and deny same-sex married couples
benefits. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 n.126 (D. Mass. 2010). In
essence, Judge Tauro provided a history of the federal government’s involvement in family
structure, but then said that the federal government cannot interfere with the state in these areas.
Balkin, supra note 122. Also, the Tenth Amendment test that Judge Tauro applied is on shaky
precedential grounds. He even acknowledged that there is Supreme Court precedent contrary to
his test, but defended his test on First Circuit precedent after the Supreme Court decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Mass. v. HHS, 698
F. Supp. 2d at 252 n.154. However, further review of the First Circuit precedent shows that it
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2. Equal Protection Precedent
Could Shape Future DOMA Challenges
Same-sex binational couples will have an easier time
challenging DOMA as it applies to immigration based on an equal
protection argument. This first requires the First Circuit to agree with
Judge Tauro’s reasoning in Gill that no purpose exists for DOMA
besides prejudice.126 Such precedent could be used to bolster the
arguments in newly filed DOMA challenges and in any future
challenges to DOMA, but a Supreme Court decision would be
necessary to end DOMA’s effects nationwide. Assuming that the
Court grants certiorari and accepts the equal protection argument, it
will most likely apply rational basis review. Judge Tauro avoided
applying a strict scrutiny test since DOMA failed under rational
basis,127 so it would be unnecessary for the Court to address strict
scrutiny analysis.
Gill rests on a Romer-like animus rationale; if the only rational
basis for DOMA is animus, it cannot stand. The biggest issue for the
Court to consider, then, is the government’s interests in passing
DOMA. In defending DOMA, the DOJ chose to abandon the initial
four congressional reasons for passing DOMA128 and instead
proposed two new interests: preserving the status quo and taking an
incremental response to social problems.129 The DOJ’s abandonment
of DOMA’s original rationale suggests an implicit recognition of the
lack of legitimate goals in light of Romer and Lawrence.130 While
Judge Tauro’s analysis did not emphasize this point, the DOJ’s shift
will have traction in later challenges to DOMA, especially in light of
the DOJ’s new position on sexual-orientation classifications after

relied on a Supreme Court case prior to Garcia. See United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027,
1033 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
287–88 (1981)).
126. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
127. Id. at 387.
128. The House Report listed four standard arguments (similar to the Proposition 8
proponents’ arguments) for not recognizing so-called same-sex marriage—procreation, morality,
tradition, and preserving resources. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 at 12–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2920–22.
129. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
130. See Jack M. Balkin, More on Gill v. OPM and the Equal Protection Argument Against
DOMA, BALKINIZATION (July 9, 2010, 2:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/more-ongill-v-opm-and-equal-protection.html.
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Gill.131 Even without the DOJ’s implication that past rationales are
insufficient, there is some legislative history that indicates Congress
passed DOMA because of animus toward gay and lesbians.132
Assuming that the Court agrees with Judge Tauro that the
original rationale and the new DOJ argument in support of DOMA
are illegitimate,133 the only conceivable rationale left is animus.
Animus is not a legitimate government interest, so DOMA cannot
stand.134 Though the Gill litigation only technically applies to samesex couples applying for the listed federal benefits in Massachusetts
(or, at most, the seven jurisdictions that allow the marriage of samesex couples), it would be difficult for DOMA to stand up to further
challenges under the animus rationale. If DOMA has no legitimate
purpose besides animus, it cannot withstand even rational basis
review and should be struck down completely, not just in
Massachusetts. Thus, same-sex binational couples could easily file
another case attacking DOMA on its face using the precedent that is
set in a Gill appeal.135 Though it is not certain that the Supreme Court
would agree with Judge Tauro, such a ruling would certainly remove
the largest obstacle to family unification for same-sex binational
families—DOMA.
D. Perry and New DOJ Stance Bolster Gill Holding
While Gill struck down DOMA under rational basis review,
DOMA may potentially be subject to heightened scrutiny. On
February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder informed House
Speaker John Boehner that President Obama believes that DOMA
Section 3 is unconstitutional.136 This development arose out of the
131. See infra discussion accompanying notes 136–140.
132. See infra notes 194–195 and accompanying text.
133. It must be assumed that the Supreme Court would accept Judge Tauro’s reasoning in
order to discuss the possible effect of a ruling on same-sex binational couples. However, it is far
from clear that such a ruling would happen in the current Court. See Balkin, supra note 130.
134. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)) (“‘[W]hen
the proffered rationales for a law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a reviewing court may
infer that animus is the only explicable basis. [Because] animus alone cannot constitute a
legitimate government interest,’ this court finds that DOMA lacks a rational basis to support it.”).
135. The animus argument would not be as strong for an as-applied-to-immigration challenge.
The legislative history may show that there is general animus toward so-called same-sex
marriage, but there is no evidence of specific animus toward binational couples.
136. Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Speaker John A. Boehner 1 (Feb. 23,
2011) [hereinafter Eric Holder Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/49404879/
Attorney-General-Holder-s-Letter-to-John-Boehner-on-DOMA-Appeal.
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Windsor and Pederson cases that were filed after Gill.137 Those cases
are proceeding in the Second Circuit, where there is no precedent on
the level of scrutiny that a court should apply to classifications based
on sexual orientation.138 Accordingly, the DOJ reviewed the criteria
for judging whether heightened scrutiny applies and concluded that
classifications based on sexual orientation should receive heightened
scrutiny.139 While the DOJ will continue to defend DOMA if rational
basis applies, the DOJ feels that, under heightened scrutiny, DOMA
is unconstitutional as it applies to same-sex couples whose marriages
are legally recognized under state law.140
This development is welcome news for same-sex binational
couples who can use the DOJ’s rationale to attack DOMA on its face
or as it applies to immigration.141 The DOJ’s new stance has already
proved helpful in stopping deportation proceedings of same-sex
binational couples, and members of Congress have asked the Obama
administration to halt the denial of green card applications of samesex foreign spouses.142 However, the DOJ is not the final arbiter on
this; the federal courts still have to weigh in. With the Windsor and
Pederson cases pending, the House of Representatives will step in to
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 2–3.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Savage & Stolberg, supra note 83 (“If the courts agree with the administration’s view of
how to evaluate gay-rights claims of official discrimination, it could open the door to new legal
challenges to many other government policies that treat gay people unequally—including federal
laws that make it easier for noncitizen spouses to apply for legal residency . . . .”).
142. An immigration judge and government attorneys agreed to halt deportation orders for an
Argentine woman who was legally married to a woman in Connecticut, citing the DOJ’s stance
on DOMA as a likely reason. Kristen Hamill, Woman Escapes Deportation Until Status of SameSex Marriage Made Clear, CNN (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/03/25/
new.york.marriage.law/index.html?section=cnn_latest. Also, the federal government, through
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, canceled a deportation order for a Venezuelan man in
New Jersey who is legally married to a man, saying that this deportation “is not [a] . . . priority at
this time.” While it is only one decision, immigration lawyers see this as a “significant shift” in
policy for immigrants in same-sex marriages. Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings
Against Immigration in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16. Several
members of Congress sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano requesting that they halt removals proceedings and hold same-sex
marriage-based immigration petitions in abeyance. Chris Geidner, Senators Kerry, Leahy, 10
Others Ask DOJ, DHS to Hold Same-Sex Bi-National Couples’ Immigration Petitions, POLIGLOT
(Apr. 6, 2011 2:42 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/04/senators-kerry-leahy-10others.html. Then in May 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder vacated a decision by the BIA in
order to determine whether a person in a New Jersey civil union could be considered a spouse
under immigration law. Matter of Dorman, 25 I&N Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011).
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defend the law.143 Lawyers for the House filed briefs in the Windsor
case seeking a deferential rational basis review, arguing that sexual
orientation is not immutable and gays and lesbians are not politically
powerless.144
Without any precedent on point, it is uncertain how the
arguments will fare in the Second Circuit. Any precedent set in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger145 may predict the success of the
heightened-scrutiny argument. The Perry litigation is over a state
law, not DOMA, but it analyzes suspect classifications and
heightened scrutiny as they apply in that state.146 With the new DOJ
stance on sexual orientation classification, the heightened scrutiny
rationale employed in Perry may have more traction.147 On the other
hand, the Perry equal protection holding was grounded in the animus
toward gay and lesbians—similar to the Gill holding. Thus, rational
basis may indeed be the applicable standard in the Perry appeal. If
Perry is decided on rational basis review, the House of
Representatives’ argument to apply rational basis to DOMA would
be bolstered. So same-sex binational couples may ultimately still
need to rely on the Gill rationale. With many pending issues before
the courts, it is unknown whether Perry or Gill will reach the
Supreme Court first, if at all. Regardless, same-sex binational
couples should understand that any precedent that the Supreme Court
sets in Perry will illuminate the successful arguments in Gill, the
new DOMA cases (Windsor and Pederson), and any future cases
challenging DOMA on its face or as it applies to family-based
immigration.148
143. Lisa Mascaro & David G. Savage, GOP Starts Work on Legal Defense of Marriage Law,
L.A. TIMES, March 5, 2011, at A9.
144. Brian Moulton, House Lawyers Explain Why Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians
Is Okay, HRC BACK STORY (Aug. 3, 2011 12:53 PM), http://www.hrcbackstory.org/2011/08/
house-lawyers-explain-why-discrimination-against-gays-and-lesbians-is-okay/#.TjnVaHOxric.
145. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
146. See infra discussion Part IV.D.
147. The plaintiffs in Perry filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to lift the stay on Feb. 23,
2011, and cited the rationale in Eric Holder’s letter subjecting classifications based on sexual
orientation to heightened scrutiny. Motion to Vacate Stay Pending Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellees
Kristin M. Perry et al. at 4, 7, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011),
2011 WL 638819, at *4, *7; Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136.
148. If the Supreme Court were to decide Gill using a Romer animus rationale, like Judge
Tauro did, then it would be difficult for the Court to not affirm Perry given Judge Walker’s
reliance on that rationale. Only if the cases were decided on different grounds—not equal
protection—is the combined outcome clearer. If the Court were to find a fundamental right in
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IV. PERRY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION
Independent of Gill and Mass. v. HHS, another federal case may
be used to attack DOMA and its denial of family-based immigration
to same-sex binational couples. One step toward immigration
equality for same-sex binational couples would be nationwide
marriage equality. A current federal court case, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, may produce this result. If the Supreme Court
affirms the lower court’s decision declaring marriage to be a
fundamental right for all adult couples (including gays and lesbians),
it is unlikely that DOMA could stand.149 However, this is only one
possible outcome of the Perry litigation. The Court could also decide
the case on different rationales: equal protection grounds or a limited
basis that applies only to California. These possible holdings in
Perry could form the bases of subsequent legal challenges to
DOMA, which are necessary for same-sex binational couples to
ultimately achieve immigration equality.
A. Perry: History, Holding, and Appeal
The Perry litigation arises out of the marriage equality battle in
California. On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court held that
the California Constitution guarantees same-sex couples marriage
rights equal to those of opposite-sex couples.150 This decision was
implicitly overturned when voters passed Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”) on
November 5, 2008.151 Prop 8 added a new provision to the California
Constitution, stating that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California.”152 The amendment was

Perry, then DOMA would be subject to strict scrutiny and almost certainly struck down. If the
Court were to decide DOMA on the Mass. v. HHS Tenth Amendment grounds, then Perry would
not be implicated. The ultimate interplay between Perry, Gill, and maybe even Mass. v. HHS will
not be clear for some time, at least until the U.S. Courts of Appeals rule.
149. See infra Part IV.C.
150. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 857 (Cal. 2008).
151. Jessica Garrison, Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard C. Paddock, Election 2008: Gay
Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A2.
152. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 8, at 128 (2008),
available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposedlaws.pdf#prop8.
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challenged under the California Constitution, but was ultimately
upheld by the California Supreme Court.153
The American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER) filed a suit
challenging Prop 8 under the U.S. Constitution.154 Chief U.S. District
Judge Vaughn R. Walker fast-tracked the trial155 and issued his ruling
on August 4, 2010, finding Prop 8 unconstitutional as a violation of
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.156 He ruled that marriage is a fundamental right and that
excluding same-sex couples from marriage was not rationally related
to any legitimate state interest.157 Judge Walker therefore inferred
that Prop 8 was based on either moral disapproval of homosexuality
or animus toward gays and lesbians, which are both improper
justifications for legislation.158 Thus, Prop 8 failed to satisfy rational
basis review and was struck down.159
The proponents of Prop 8 appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which stayed Judge Walker’s order.160 The
Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on December 6, 2010, regarding
the Prop 8 proponents’ standing to appeal and the merits of Judge
Walker’s ruling. If the appellate court finds that the proponents of
Prop 8 have no standing, Judge Walker’s opinion would stand,
returning California to the list of U.S. jurisdictions that grant

153. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 153 (Cal. 2008).
154. Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAWYER (Jan.
2010), http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1. AFER’s case was argued by
Ted Olson and David Boies, who famously opposed each other in Bush v. Gore. Id. This case was
filed against the wishes of many gay and lesbian organizations that were worried about the risks
of a negative decision. Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal Experts Concerned by Fed
Prop. 8 Case, ADVOCATE (May 27, 2009), http://www.advocate.com/Politics/Marriage_Equality/
Legal_Experts_Outraged_by_Federal_Prop__8_Case/.
155. Ashby Jones, Judge Puts Boies and Olson’s Prop. 8 Challenge on Fast Track to Trial,
WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/07/01/judge-puts-boies-and-olsonsprop-8-challenge-on-fast-track-to-trial/
156. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
157. Id. at 994–96. Judge Walker analyzed the six purported interests set forth by the
proponents of Prop 8 and found that none had merit or support. See id. at 998–1002.
158. Id. at 1002 (“[A]nimus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship
between a man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship between two men or two
women, this belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate.”).
159. Usually when a fundamental right is at stake, strict scrutiny applies. However, Judge
Walker did not apply such scrutiny since even deferential rational basis could not be met. For
explanation of the levels of scrutiny, see supra note 74.
160. Carolyn Tyler, 9th Circuit Grants Indefinite Stay in Prop 8 Case, ABC 7 (Aug. 17,
2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/san_francisco&id=7612521.
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marriage rights to same-sex couples.161 This would have no effect on
binational couples seeking equal immigration rights since federal law
would be left unchanged. If, however, the Ninth Circuit rules on the
merits,162 then the U.S. Supreme Court could hear the case,
potentially leading to a change in federal law and relief for same-sex
binational couples.
B. Reversal Would Be a Setback
The Supreme Court could, of course, not uphold Perry.163 The
Court could find that marriage is not a fundamental right that extends
to gays and lesbians and that Prop 8 does not violate equal
protection.164 Same-sex couples then would have no precedent on
which to build a DOMA challenge. In fact, a reversal would likely
set back the Gill litigation, since that decision relies on the animus
rationale in Romer. If the Court does not agree with Judge Walker’s
analysis of Romer as it applies to Prop 8, it is very unlikely that the
Court would find animus in the passage of DOMA. With a defeat in
Perry, efforts to achieve immigration equality through marriage
litigation would stall.
A Supreme Court affirmance of Perry would be necessary, but
not sufficient, to remedy current family-based immigration
inequality. However, whether affirmation could lead to federal
marriage equality and a basis for challenging the inequality in
family-based immigration depends on the scope of the holding.
There are two different constitutional grounds on which reviewing

161. The Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether
Prop 8 proponents have standing. The California Supreme Court will decide this question with a
hearing to be held “as early as September [2011].” Maura Dolan, State Justices to Take Up
Prop. 8: At Issue Is Whether the Measure’s Backers Have Legal Standing to Defend It in Court,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at AA1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-meproposition8-20110217,0,2933016.story.
162. This Article does not speculate on how the Ninth Circuit would rule. As the Associated
Press states, the Ninth Circuit is the “least predictable” appeals court. Paul Elias, Associated
Press, Gay Marriage Appeal Faces Uncertain Future Before Nation’s Largest, Least Predictable
Appeals Court: Analysis, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/nation/
index.ssf/2010/08/gay_marriage_appeal_faces_unce.html.
163. The Court could also deny certiorari, leaving any Ninth Circuit precedent standing.
164. This Article does not analyze the reasoning of such a decision because it would not
change the state of the law for same-sex binational couples, which is the focus of this Article. The
reasoning could likely follow that of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
which found no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy in the history and traditions of the
United States.
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courts could uphold Perry: due process or equal protection. Each
ground presents a unique argument that same-sex couples can use in
challenging DOMA and its effect on immigration law.
C. Fundamental Right to Marry
Will Bring an End to DOMA
A broad holding affirming Judge Walker’s ruling that Prop 8
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would not only bring about nationwide marriage equality but likely
lead to family-based immigration for same-sex binational couples.165
Affirming Judge Walker’s due process holding requires the
Court to find that same-sex couples possess the fundamental right to
marry. Once a fundamental right becomes constitutionally protected,
strict scrutiny applies to all government action that impinges on that
right. Under this exacting standard, it is unlikely that Prop 8 or any
other state law denying marriage to same-sex couples could stand.
This broad ruling would provide a strong precedent for same-sex
binational couples who are challenging unequal immigration laws.
Perry does not directly implicate DOMA, but it could be used to
overturn the law in a new case that is brought under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.166 If marriage is a fundamental
right that extends to gays and lesbians, DOMA impinges that right
and a court would likely overturn it under strict scrutiny.167

165. Predicting the likelihood that the current Supreme Court will constitutionally enshrine
marriage equality is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is also something that same-sex
binational couples must consider in evaluating their options for obtaining immigration equality.
For a discussion of the possibility of the Supreme Court upholding Judge Walker’s due process
arguments, see Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes Down California’s Proposition 8: Will
the Ruling Ultimately Advance or Retard Civil Rights for LGBT Americans, FINDLAW (Aug. 9,
2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html (“It is widely assumed that at least four
of the current Justices—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito—would vote to reject a right to same-sex marriage.”). See also John
Schwartz, In Same-Sex Ruling, an Eye on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/06assess.html (citing Professor Douglas NeJaime’s
explanation that “even the four more liberal justices on the Court might shy away from a
sweeping decision that could overturn same-sex marriage bans across the country”).
166. A Perry decision would not ipso facto mean that DOMA is overturned. Perry rests on
the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states, and does not challenge any federal
laws. Another case would be necessary to assert that DOMA impedes on the fundamental right to
marry declared in Perry. DOMA would be challenged under Fifth Amendment due process,
which applies to federal legislation.
167. This assumes that there is no compelling reason to exclude gays and lesbians from
marriage that is narrowly tailored to that purpose. See supra note 74.
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Without DOMA and with a fundamental right to marry, samesex binational couples could get married in all states, and the federal
government would have no statutory reason for refusing to recognize
such marriages. Since the INA does not define “spouse,” the “valid
where performed” rule would apply to same-sex couples.168 Gay and
lesbian U.S. citizens could then sponsor their spouses as immediate
relatives. Thus, a holding that gays and lesbians have the
fundamental right to marry would bring about immigration equality
for same-sex binational couples. However, the Court could avoid the
fundamental-right issue by deciding the case solely on equal
protection grounds.
D. Many Equal Protection Arguments:
Most Lead to End of DOMA
The equal protection analysis gives the Court greater flexibility
in determining the scope of its ruling, but the analysis also provides
more avenues for same-sex couples to challenge DOMA. The
Court’s could ground its equal protection ruling in several different
rationales: finding sexual orientation to be a suspect classification,
finding discrimination based on gender, or finding that the law fails
to meet the rational basis test because it is motivated by animus or
moral disapproval alone. All of these possible holdings would
provide different legal arguments for same-sex binational couples
who are challenging immigration equality.
1. Suspect Classification:
Broad, but Unlikely to Be Considered
Aside from the Court ruling that marriage is a fundamental right
that same-sex couples enjoy, the next most sweeping decision for
same-sex couples (including binational couples) would be for the
Court to find that classifications that are based on sexual orientation
are suspect. Then, all state action discriminating against gays and
lesbians would be subject to some heightened level of scrutiny.169
Same-sex binational couples could steer clear of the marriage
168. For a full analysis of the INA definition of spouse without DOMA, see infra Part V.
169. Since the Court has yet to consider whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class, it is
unclear which level of scrutiny would apply. An analysis of the appropriate level of scrutiny may
look similar to the DOJ’s rationale behind deciding that heightened scrutiny is applicable to
sexual orientation classifications. See Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136.
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argument and challenge the INA’s treatment of gay and lesbian
couples directly under equal protection.170 The problem is that the
INA is not facially discriminatory, as it neither defines “spouse” nor
explicitly excludes gays and lesbians. Without facial discrimination,
proof of a discriminatory purpose is necessary.171 It will be difficult
to find such a purpose within the INA. On the other hand, DOMA is
facially discriminatory, so no showing of a discriminatory purpose
would be required. Thus, any litigation would need to focus on
attacking DOMA on its face or as it applies to immigration. The
ultimate result would depend on whether the Court, in a Perry ruling,
chose to apply strict scrutiny—which is usually fatal to the
challenged law—or some intermediate scrutiny akin to gender
discrimination.172 While potentially yielding a promising result for
same-sex binational families, an equal protection holding based on a
suspect class is not likely in Perry, since Judge Walker did not
explicitly rule on those grounds and the Supreme Court avoided a
similar holding in Lawrence.173
2. Gender-Based Discrimination
However, Judge Walker did conclude that discrimination based
on sexual orientation is equivalent to discrimination based on
gender.174 Perry was denied marriage to a woman because she was a
woman. If Perry were a man, Prop 8 would not prohibit her

170. The INA would have to be challenged under the equal protection principles interpreted
in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Although the Fifth Amendment’s text has no
equal protection language, the Court has interpreted an equal protection component to the
amendment’s Due Process Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
171. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 74, at 793.
172. For a discussion of levels of scrutiny, see supra note 74. While the DOJ is not a party to
Perry, its new stance on sexual orientation classifications could influence the discussion of
suspect classifications here, which would then point the Court toward intermediate scrutiny. See
Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136.
173. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since Lawrence, the Court has hinted at
protecting sexual orientation. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Martinez stated, “Our
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of sexual
orientation].” Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). Yet, the case was
decided solely on First Amendment grounds, so that is only dicta, not law.
174. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The terms
“sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably in these cases, but scholarly debate questions
whether the terms actually have different meanings. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL
& JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 253–55
(3d. ed. 2008).
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marriage.175 On the other hand, Prop 8 is arguably gender neutral
because it applies equally, prohibiting so-called same-sex marriage
regardless of gender. However, the Supreme Court in race
discrimination cases has expressly rejected the “equal application”
argument.176 There is debate whether the Court would also reject this
argument in the sexual orientation context.177 If the Supreme Court
were to find that the equal application argument also fails in this
context, then it would apply intermediate scrutiny and strike down
Prop 8.178
Then, same-sex binational couples could challenge DOMA
under this heightened scrutiny precedent, since DOMA similarly
prevents recognition of marriage based on the gender of the
individuals involved.179 Or, same-sex binational couples could
directly challenge immigration laws that deny family-based
immigration solely because of the couple’s gender (male-male or
female-female). The Court has previously applied heightened
scrutiny in gender discrimination claims against immigration laws,180
so this argument has solid support. The only problem for same-sex
binational couples is getting the Court to hold that sexual orientation
discrimination is akin to gender discrimination. The Court may avoid
this ruling by deciding the case based on rational basis review.181
175. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996. (“Here, for example, Perry is prohibited from marrying
Stier, a woman, because Perry is a woman. If Perry were a man, Proposition 8 would not prohibit
the marriage. Thus, Proposition 8 operates to restrict Perry’s choice of marital partner because of
her sex.”).
176. See Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 480–87
(2007).
177. Id. Compare Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10–11 (N.Y. 2006) (“Women and men
are treated alike—they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their
own sex. This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving.”),
with Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 29 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“That the statutory scheme applies
equally to both sexes does not alter the conclusion that the classification here is based on sex.”).
178. This assumes that there is no important government interest. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 74.
179. Section 3 defines marriage as between one man and one woman. See text accompanying
supra note 67.
180. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (applying heightened scrutiny while ultimately
upholding an immigration law because there are real differences between the sexes in relation to
the birth process).
181. While he found gender discrimination, Judge Walker did not apply heightened scrutiny
because he found that Prop 8 failed to satisfy even rational basis review. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Court could similarly avoid the
gender argument by concentrating only on rational basis review.
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3. Rational Basis Can Be Used to
Strike Down Proposition 8 and DOMA
Judge Walker’s equal protection holding, like Judge Tauro’s
holding in Gill, rests on rational basis review. Although rational basis
is the most deferential standard of review, the Court used it to strike
down laws discriminating against homosexuals in Romer and
Lawrence. If the Court follows that precedent to strike down Prop 8,
then same-sex binational couples could use the same reasoning to
facially challenge DOMA as a violation of equal protection.
Judge Walker indicated that moral disapproval of so-called
same-sex marriage was the only reason for Prop 8.182 Per Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence, “[M]oral disapproval,
without any other asserted state interest,” has never been a rational
basis for legislation.183 Affirming Perry based on this moral
disapproval argument would provide strong precedent for same-sex
binational couples to challenge DOMA as a violation of equal
protection;184 DOMA’s legislative history demonstrates that many
members of Congress supported DOMA because they believed
homosexuality to be immoral.185
The obstacle for same-sex binational couples is showing that
there is no justification for DOMA besides morality. Since Prop 8
supporters advance similar justifications to those that appear in the
DOMA legislative history, the Court’s overturning of Prop 8 would
strongly impact any DOMA challenge.186 The only obstacles are the

182. Id. at 998–1003.
183. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority
in Lawrence was not explicit on whether morality is a sufficient basis for legislation, so it is
beyond the scope of this Article to predict the Court’s treatment of this issue.
184. DOMA would have to be challenged under the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Prop 8
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tom
Coburn) (calling homosexuality “immoral” and “depraved”); Aff. of Gary D. Buseck, Ex. D, H.R.
Rep. No. 104-664 at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (reflecting Congress’s
“moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports
with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”).
186. Prop 8 supporters cite
(1) reserving marriage as a union between a man and a woman and excluding any other
relationship from marriage; (2) proceeding with caution when implementing social
changes; (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over same-sex parenting; (4) protecting
the freedom of those who oppose marriage for same-sex couples; (5) treating same-sex
couples differently from opposite-sex couples.
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DOJ’s new justifications in defending DOMA,187 which Judge Tauro
has already found to lack merit in Gill.188 In all, DOMA would not
likely withstand an equal protection challenge if the Court were to
find Prop 8 unconstitutional under Justice O’Connor’s moralityalone rationale.
The problem for same-sex binational couples is that the Court
may want to avoid an explicit Perry holding based on O’Connor’s
morality-alone rationale since many laws are, in fact, based on
morality.189 The Court could root a more limited opinion in the
animus rationale from Romer. Judge Walker’s finding of fact
implicates the stigma that caused the passage of Prop 8.190 As in
Romer, the Court could find that Prop 8 is “born of animosity”
toward gays and lesbians.191 This is not a legitimate government
interest,192 so Prop 8 would fail to survive even a rational basis
review.
Assuming that the Court affirms Perry based on Romer, samesex binational couples would again need to use that precedent to
mount a challenge against DOMA.193 It is clear that Congress enacted
DOMA knowing that it presented a potential constitutional issue
under Romer.194 However, the existence of a constitutional issue does
not necessarily mean that the bill was born of animosity. But there is
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998. DOMA’s original justifications were procreation, morality,
tradition, and preserving resources. See supra note 128.
187. See supra text accompanying note 129.
188. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391–96 (D. Mass. 2010).
189. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74.
191. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). The Court could of course distinguish Prop 8
from Romer. Prop 8 applies narrowly to marriage and does not restrict same-sex couples’ use of
the political process, unlike the Colorado amendment that was “far reaching” and “forbid[]
reinstatement” of the protections that it had taken away. Id. at 627.
192. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”).
193. This challenge would again be under the equal protection principles interpreted in the
Fifth Amendment. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,100-02 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (“Scholarly opinion is clear: [DOMA] is plainly unconstitutional.”); A Bill to Define
and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 48 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor, University of
Chicago Law School) (“Insofar as [DOMA] draws the particular line that it does, it risks running
afoul of Romer’s prohibition on laws based on ‘animus’ against homosexuals.”).
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legislative history that points to Congress’ disapproval of
homosexuals.195 This could be seen as moral disapproval rather than
as animus. How the Court will construe the legislative history of
DOMA is uncertain, but the animus rationale would be a viable
argument if the Supreme Court extended Romer to Perry. Assuming
that Congress enacted DOMA based on animus, there would be no
rational basis for the Court to uphold the law.196
Using similar logic, the Court could strike down Prop 8 as
unconstitutional using Romer but craft a narrow decision only
applicable to California. This would allow the Court to find Prop 8
unconstitutional without committing itself to nationwide marriage
equality or providing strong precedent to those who seek to attack
DOMA.197 Under California’s domestic partnership law, same-sex
couples receive essentially all of the same rights and responsibilities
that married couples receive.198 Prop 8 did not infringe those rights,
so the only distinction between domestic partnerships and marriage
is the word “marriage”; Ninth Circuit Judge N. Rand Smith
characterized this distinction as irrational.199 The Ninth Circuit also
seemed to concentrate on the parallels between Prop 8 and the
Colorado amendment that Romer struck down.200 Romer rebuked
withdrawing legal rights that a group had been enjoying,201 which
California did by first issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples
and then denying that issuance.202 While some states do provide
195. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7501 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry
Hyde) (“[M]ost people do not approve of homosexual conduct . . . and they express their
disapprobation through [DOMA].”). For a detailed discussion of DOMA and Romer, see Andrew
Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923 (2010).
196. This is very similar to the reasoning in Gill. See supra text accompanying note 102–06.
197. Though this holding may be the most probable, it is given short treatment in this Article
since it has little effect on same-sex binational couples.
198. DENNIS CLIFFORD ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES 33 (15th ed.
2010).
199. Maura Dolan & Jessica Garrison, Judges Explore Narrow Options in Prop. 8 Appeal,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-1207prop8-20101207,0,3172063,full.story (“‘We’re left with a word—“marriage,”’ [Judge] Smith
said. ‘What is the rational basis for that?’”).
200. Id. (“Reinhardt, the circuit’s most liberal judge, noted that Proposition 8 took away a
right that gays and lesbians had been enjoying, just as the Colorado initiative repealed antidiscrimination laws that had protected gays.”).
201. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (“The amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination,
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”).
202. Dolan & Garrison, supra note 199, at A1.
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domestic partnerships, no other state previously provided marriage
rights to same-sex couples and then took them away.203 Further,
Congress may have enacted DOMA for the promotion of morality,
but the Act neither took away any previously existing right nor made
a distinction only on the word “marriage.”204 Thus, the Supreme
Court could strike down Prop 8, as it applies in California, without
directly affecting any other states or DOMA by concentrating on the
withdrawal of rights and the distinction based on one word—
marriage.
The ultimate breadth or narrowness of any Supreme Court ruling
is not clear, but same-sex couples must hope for a broad equal
protection holding that applies beyond California. If the Court
renders such a decision, same-sex couples will have strong precedent
to attack DOMA. Without DOMA, marriages of same-sex couples
would no longer be barred from federal recognition. Same-sex
binational couples who are legally married would then likely receive
INA recognition as “spouses,” yet they will have to overcome
several hurdles along the way.
V. IMMIGRATION ISSUES
POST-DOMA
In order for same-sex binational couples to be equal under the
INA,205 DOMA must either be repealed (by the passage of the
Respect for Marriage Act) or be judicially overturned (based on Gill,
Mass. v. HHS, or even Perry). Yet even if DOMA were no longer
law, same-sex couples would be left to navigate the unclear
patchwork of state marriage laws. Further, binational couples would
be left without a clear definition of what constitutes marriage under
the INA. While the current three-step approach to marriage
recognition under the INA would still remain following a legislative
repeal or judicial invalidation of DOMA, the federal government
203. Id.
204. When DOMA was passed, no state performed marriages between individuals of the same
sex. See supra text accompanying note 69. Also, no federal law gives similar benefits to a
marriage under a different name, like a domestic partnership. This, however, would be the case if
the UAFA were passed. See infra Part VI.
205. The word “equal” is chosen to implicate the difference between this solution and the
UAFA discussed in Part VI. The UAFA would provide a possibility of family-based immigration
for same-sex couples, but Part VI.C–D discusses the different criteria used for same-sex couples
(even spouses) versus opposite-sex couples.
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could potentially use its plenary power over immigration to define
marriage anew for immigration purposes. Below, this Article
explores the possible resolutions to these open issues to provide a
clear path to immigration equality for same-sex binational couples in
a hypothetical post-DOMA world.
A. Defining Marriage for Immigration
In the absence of DOMA, some definition of the term
“marriage” will be required in order to permit gay and lesbian U.S.
citizens and LPRs to sponsor their spouses. The federal government
could create a definition or the current three-step approach could be
interpreted to apply to marriages between individuals of the same
sex. The latter is more likely.
1. Creating a New Definition for Marriage Is Unlikely
In theory, Congress could choose to create a federal definition of
marriage or spouse for immigration purposes only. This, however,
seems improbable because defining marriage in only one area would
be completely inconsistent with the current federal deference to state
law206 and may even encroach on federalism principles.207 If Congress
still felt that a definition was necessary, it could create one universal
definition of marriage or spouse that would not violate any court
ruling regarding DOMA’s constitutionality. This would likely
require a malleable definition of spouse, such as the one in Black’s
Law Dictionary: “[o]ne’s husband or wife by lawful marriage.”208
Such a federal definition would be consistent with the current
approach—leaving the states to define what a lawful marriage is.
Adding a definition that reflects already current law would be
superfluous, making Congress unlikely to do so.
2. Plenary Power Is Not an Obstacle
On the other hand, even in a post-DOMA world, it is
theoretically possible that Congress could still choose to create a

206. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 n.126 (D. Mass. 2010).
207. If the DOMA were overturned on Tenth Amendment grounds, Congress’s act of defining
“spouse” in immigration may again exceed its power by entering the realm of family law. See
discussion of Mass. v. HHS supra Part III.B. On the other hand, Congress may invoke its plenary
power here.
208. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (9th ed. 2009).
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federal marriage definition for immigration that continues to exclude
gays and lesbians from family-based immigration. It is doubtful that
Congress would take such an approach if it were to repeal DOMA,
but the approach is plausible if DOMA were judicially overturned.209
Congress may want to strike back at the Court and thus could use its
plenary power over immigration to define spouse210—for
immigration purposes only—to exclude marriages of same-sex
couples. While the courts are very deferential to Congress in
immigration contexts, a U.S. citizen (one part of a same-sex
binational couple) would have strong legal arguments to attack such
a use of the plenary power in a post-DOMA world as a violation of
equal protection.
The Constitution provides Congress with the power “[t]o
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,”211 but it is silent as to
admission and expulsion of aliens.212 Nonetheless, since 1889 the
Supreme Court has recognized the so-called plenary power of
Congress over immigration.213 According to the Court, the federal
government enjoys an unfettered right to exclude, and that exercise
of power merits extraordinary judicial deference.214 Justification for
the power is found in the general grant of federal power over foreign
relations and as “an incident of sovereignty.”215 The power applies to
both substance and procedure216 and continues into the twentieth
century, even in spite of some immigration laws’ discriminatory

209. Congress could pass a law that potentially violates a DOMA ruling. After all, the
legislative history of DOMA shows an understanding of a potential conflict with Romer. See
supra note 194.
210. This is different than arguing that there should be judicial deference to DOMA in the
immigration context because, as the DOJ has said, “neither DOMA nor its legislative history
suggest that DOMA was enacted as an exercise of Congress’s plenary power.” Chris Geidner,
Defending DOMA, Fighting Back, METRO WEEKLY (Sept. 6, 2011 2:53 PM), http://metroweekly.
com/news/?ak=6543.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
212. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 192.
213. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
214. Id. at 603–04.
215. Id. at 609. For further discussion of the plenary power and its justifications, see Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.
545 (1990).
216. Motomura, supra note 215, at 552.
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effects.217 Invoking this power, Congress could amend the INA to
explicitly discriminate against same-sex binational couples.
However, new developments in the law suggest a limiting of this
plenary power—especially when a U.S. citizen is involved.
Recent precedent demonstrates that the Court is deferring less to
Congress in the immigration context.218 The Court specifically noted
that the plenary power over immigration “is subject to important
constitutional limitations”219 and cannot “offend some other
constitutional restriction[s].”220 Under this rationale, the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection principles would limit Congress’
continued exclusion of same-sex binational couples, if any, in a postDOMA world.221
In two recent equal protection decisions, the Court demonstrated
its willingness to apply heightened scrutiny even to immigration
laws.222 The Court, however, stated that it would only decide the
equal protection challenge in Nguyen v. INS223 because Nguyen’s
U.S. citizen father was a party to the suit. Unlike most plaintiffs
challenging immigration laws, same-sex binational couples include
217. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977) (allowing immigration laws to deny an
unmarried father immigration preferences because such decisions were “solely for the
responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of [the Supreme] Court to control.”
(quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
218. Whitney Chelgren, Developments Article, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is
Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1477, 1514–16 (2011). Though Fiallo v. Bell rejected an equal protection attack on an
immigration statute, the Court left the door open for judicial review. 430 U.S. at 792, 793 n.5
(“Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even
with respect to the power of the Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of
aliens . . . .”). Lower courts have taken this language, combined with the “facially legitimate and
bona fide reason” test from Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), to support judicial
review in immigration. Following these lower court decisions it appears the plenary power is
diminishing. See Motomura, supra note 215, at 607–13.
219. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). While the case was decided on statutory
grounds, the constitutional values may have influenced the decision.
220. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976).
221. See supra note 166.
222. The Court first indicated a willingness to extend heightened scrutiny to an equal
protection challenge in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). While no opinion received a
majority vote, the opinions of five different justices indicated a willingness to extend intermediate
scrutiny to equal protection claims in immigration matters. Pinix, supra note 4, at 481. Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence specifically stated that she would only be willing to apply intermediate
scrutiny if the citizen father was in the case. Id. at 484. Then in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60–
61 (2001), while it ultimately upheld the law, the Court did apply a heightened scrutiny to the
gender discrimination claim.
223. 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2011).
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one person who is either a U.S. citizen or LPR.224 Therefore, samesex binational couples have an even stronger claim for relief than the
plaintiffs in Nguyen do. There, the citizen was tangentially involved
with the noncitizen who suffered the direct injury. A same-sex
binational couple like Beddingfield and de Leon could challenge the
immigration law based on its direct injury to the citizen,
Beddingfield, by preventing him from sponsoring his spouse while
allowing other citizens to sponsor their spouses.
Once the couple has standing to appeal, the only open question
is what level of review the Court should apply. This would likely
depend on any precedent set in a Gill or Perry appeal that leads to
this post-DOMA world. It would seem unlikely that if the Court were
to strike down DOMA on equal protection grounds it would not also
strike down a use of the plenary power that similarly discriminates
against same-sex couples. Thus, the plenary power is not an obstacle
to same-sex binational couples seeking immigration benefits. In a
post-DOMA world, the important step for same-sex binational
couples would be getting their marriages recognized under the INA.
The current three-step approach for marriage recognition under the
INA should not pose a problem for same-sex binational couples.
3. Applying the INA Three-Step Test Allows for
Recognition of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples
Assuming that Congress does not create a universal definition of
marriage, how would “marriage” or “spouse” be defined in
immigration laws in a post-DOMA world? Immigration law (like
other federal laws) generally follows states’ (or another nation’s)
definitions of marriage.225 The INA does not explicitly provide this in
its text, but a valid marriage for purposes of the INA currently
follows a three-step approach: (1) validity where celebrated, subject
to (2) policy exceptions, and (3) bona fides.226
First, the general rule is that “a marriage valid where celebrated
is valid everywhere.”227 Courts have long enforced this principle in
224. See generally Motomura, supra note 9 (discussing so-called citizen proxy arguments).
225. See infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
226. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 550.
227. Id. at 559; see also 2 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 36.02[2][a],
at 36–4 to –8 (“The validity of a marriage ordinarily is judged by the law of the place where it is
celebrated.”).
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regard to conflict of laws and immigration.228 For family-based
immigration, married couples must demonstrate to immigration
officials through documentation that they followed the law in the
jurisdiction where they celebrated their marriage.229 This is true
whether the jurisdiction is a U.S. state or another country.230 This
deference to states extends to so-called common-law marriage231 and
even to a marriage involving a transsexual232 person. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that a transsexual woman233 is able
to sponsor a foreign-born man because North Carolina gives legal
effect to sex reassignment and recognizes the marriage as
heterosexual; thus, the marriage does not violate DOMA.234 While it
is arguable whether Congress intended to allow such marriages under
DOMA, the BIA will determine marital status per individual state
law unless it is a so-called same-sex marriage—falling explicitly
under the narrow exception in DOMA Section 3, the definitional
provision.235 Following this general rule of deference to state law, in
the absence of DOMA the INA should recognize the marriages of
same-sex couples that were performed in states or countries where
the marriages are valid, like Massachusetts or the Netherlands.
The second part of the test could—but likely does not—pose a
problem for binational same-sex couples. There is a public policy
228. See, e.g., Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 587 (1848) (“Marriage is to be decided by the
laws of the place where celebrated.” (citing Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158, 168 (1840))); Luna,
18 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (B.I.A. 1983) (“The District Director correctly noted that the validity of
a marriage generally is determined according to the law of the place of celebration.”).
229. See, e.g., FAM: VISAS 40.1, supra note 43, at note N1.1(c) (“The underlying principle in
determining the validity of the marriage is that the law of the place of marriage celebration
controls (except as noted in paragraph d of this section). If the law is complied with and the
marriage is recognized, then the marriage is deemed to be valid for immigration purposes.”).
Paragraph (d) is discussed infra note 238 and accompanying text.
230. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, § A, at 327.
231. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 562.
232. The word “transsexual” is chosen over the broader term “transgender” because
transsexual more narrowly refers to people who choose medical treatment to align their gender
identities with their physical bodies. Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-orientation: Transgendered
People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 238 (1998).
233. This refers to a person born with XY chromosomes that had surgery to reassign her body
as a female.
234. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005).
235. Id. at 751–52 (“If Hawaii or some other State eventually recognizes homosexual
‘marriage,’ Section 3 will mean simply that that ‘marriage’ will not be recognized as a ‘marriage’
for purposes of federal law. Other than this narrow federal requirement, the federal government
will continue to determine marital status in the same manner it does under current law.” (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 31 (1996))).
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exception to the general rule of validity where celebrated. Strong
public policy objections are often grounds for a state to refuse to
recognize marriages that were celebrated in another state, but an
even stronger policy is necessary in the context of immigration.236
Per the Attorney General, only express public policy in immigration
law can be used to deny admission to aliens.237 There is no express
federal public policy against so-called same-sex marriages. It could
be argued that DOMA (if it is still law) is such a public policy, but
the U.S. State Department specifically distinguishes between public
policy exceptions and DOMA when it explains which marriages
should be void.238 Further, the Obama administration’s public policy
extends benefits to same-sex couples to the extent possible under
DOMA.239 So, if DOMA were no longer law, there is no public
policy basis to refuse to respect the validity of marriages between
same-sex couples if they were valid where they were celebrated.
The final step of the analysis to determine whether a marriage is
valid under the INA requires the marriage to be bona fide. Marriage
fraud could also be labeled a federal public policy exception (rather
than the final step in assessing the validity of marriage), but,
regardless, it would not prevent INA recognition of marriages
between same-sex individuals. The INA, in several instances,
expressly lays out marriage bona fides as evidentiary requirements.240
Immigration officials try to determine whether the couple entered
into the marriage solely for the purpose of obtaining immigration
benefits. The officials will often look at numerous documents like
236. For a discussion of state public policy exceptions and their affect on the INA, see infra
Part V.B.
237. Issuance of Immigration Visa, 37 Op. Att’y. Gen. 102, 111 (1933) (“The only public
policy of the United States that I am authorized to recognize with respect to the admissibility of
aliens is that found in the immigration law.”).
238. FAM: VISAS 40.1, supra note 43, at note N1.1(d) (“Marriages, considered to be void
under State law as contrary to public policy, such as polygamous or incestuous marriages, or
which Federal law such as the Defense of Marriage Act determines does not meet the Federal
definition of a marriage, cannot be recognized for immigration purposes even if the marriage is
legal in the place of marriage celebration.”).
239. CNN Wire Staff, Obama Orders More Benefits for Same-Sex Partners of Federal
Workers, CNN (June 2, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-02/us/obama.gay.benefits_1_
same-sex-partners-federal-workers-benefits?_s=PM:US.
240. This is a requirement for permanent residence, INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(III), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2006); deportation for marriage fraud, INA § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(G); and knowingly entering into a marriage to evade immigration laws, INA
§ 275(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
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wedding photos and love letters to find the possibility of a sham
marriage.241 Marriages of same-sex couples should be able to meet
the same scrutiny if the marriages were indeed not fraudulent.242
4. Precedent Restricting
Recognition Is No Longer Valid
The only possible legal obstacle for allowing marriages of samesex couples under the INA post-DOMA is the precedent of Adams v.
Howerton, which says that Congress intended the term marriage in
the INA to only include opposite-sex couples.243 Yet, this precedent,
while it has not been overturned, is no longer valid. First, the Adams
decision relied on Congress’ express exclusion of gays and lesbians
under the INA.244 As of 1990, there is no longer an express exclusion
in the statute, so it cannot be a justification to maintain the Adams’
precedent. Also, the Ninth Circuit no longer uses test that the Adams
court applied to the INA.245 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit now
expressly acknowledges that the INA relies on state law in
determining whether a marriage exists,246 while the Adams court
looked only to federal law. Even the DOJ has argued that the reasons
for the denial of immigration benefits in Adams “are no longer valid
today.”247
Without Adams posing any significant precedential problem, in
a post-DOMA world the INA should recognize same-sex binational
couples’ valid marriages under the current three-step approach.
Assuming that federal recognition of legal marriages between samesex couples occurs, the only remaining obstacle for same-sex
immigration equality is state marriage recognition. Without criminal
prohibitions, state public policy will not likely stand in the way of
INA recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals.

241. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 581, 581 n.195.
242. In fact, the UAFA is specifically written to provide equal fraud standards for permanent
partnerships as marriages. See infra text accompanying notes 274–75.
243. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. Id. at 1040.
245. Adams used a two-part test, but a three-part test is the current black letter rule. Ageyman
v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
246. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994).
247. Geidner, supra note 210.

1382

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1339

B. State Marriage Recognition Post-DOMA
Before same-sex binational couples are eligible for family-based
immigration, they must first be married in a jurisdiction that is
willing to perform marriages for same-sex couples. As of
publication, there are only seven jurisdictions where same-sex
marriage is legal in the United States.248 The INA’s “valid where
celebrated” requirement recognizes international marriages, so the
options for gays and lesbians also include one of the ten nations that
currently allow marriages for same-sex couples.249 Unless a couple
lives in one of these sixteen places, it appears that they cannot enter
into a valid marriage. A seemingly easy solution, though, is for them
to get married in a neighboring jurisdiction that allows marriage for
individuals of the same sex, even if the couple’s state of domicile
does not.
Besides the inconvenience and expense of travel, same-sex
binational couples must be aware that state public policy exceptions
may prevent marriage recognition under the INA.250 Though most
states recognize valid marriages from other states,251 the common law
recognizes exceptions when there is a strong public policy objection
to a marriage in the couple’s state of domicile.252 Many states have a
public policy against so-called same-sex marriage.253 However, under
248. See supra note 77.
249. Id.
250. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 565.
251. This is in accordance with comity and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (“A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere
be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the
most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”
(emphasis added)). Section 2 of DOMA codifies this exception specifically for so-called samesex marriages. See supra note 66. Since Gill and Mass. v. HHS do not challenge Section 2, it
could pose an obstacle for same-sex couples seeking to have their marriages recognized in their
states of domicile. However, assuming that Section 3 is struck down, it would seem unlikely that
Section 2 could also stand, as it is likely a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Mark
Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 408–12 (2010). Also, any
precedent created in striking down Section 3 could be used to attack Section 2. For example, if
Section 3 is struck down because it was passed with animus, Section 2 could similarly be
attacked. If no violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause exists, then states are already free to
refuse recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals that were performed in other states,
so Section 2 is superfluous.
253. Thirty states have constitutional amendments prohibiting so-called same-sex marriage
and thirty-nine have statutes to a similar effect. Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77. There are also
several states without a public policy against marriages of same-sex couples. Besides the seven
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the INA the policy must be a criminal prohibition before recognition
is refused.254 After Lawrence—where a statute criminalizing samesex sodomy was ruled unconstitutional—it seems unlikely that states
could criminalize so-called same-sex marriage.255 Thus, marriages of
same-sex couples will likely be recognized under the INA, even if
the couples are not domiciled in one of the seven jurisdictions that
perform such marriages.256
The only other possible public policy that could impede INA
recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals is the
prohibition on the evasion of marriage laws. The BIA has previously
refused to recognize a marriage that violates the law of a couple’s
state of domicile—when the state expressly prohibited couples from
evading marriage laws by traveling for the purpose of marrying and
then returning.257 Therefore, same-sex couples who are domiciled in a
state that expressly prohibits the evasion of its marriage laws may
not be able to travel, get married, and, on their return, expect federal
recognition of their marriage. Yet, this rule rests on a single BIA case
that involved criminal prohibition.258 Same-sex binational couples
will need to research local laws in order to know if their state of
domicile has a criminal law prohibiting the evasion of its marriage
laws. Post-DOMA, it is plausible that state governments may pass
jurisdictions that allow such marriages, several states recognize marriages of same-sex couples
performed elsewhere. Maryland, and Rhode Island recognize marriages of same-sex couples
performed elsewhere. Id. New Mexico and New Jersey neither recognize nor prohibit marriage
between individuals of the same-sex. See id. However, the Attorney General of New Mexico
released an opinion on January 4, 2010, stating that marriages of same-sex couples performed
elsewhere can be recognized under New Mexico law. Steve Terrell, AG: Other States’ Same-Sex
Marriages
Valid
in
N.M.,
SANTA
FE
NEW
MEXICAN
(Jan. 5,
2011),
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/Local%20News/AG--Other-states--same-sex-marriagesvalid-in-N-M-. Washington approved a measure recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages as
domestic partnerships. Associated Press, WA Legislature OKs Out-of-State Same-sex Unions,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 30, 2011 1:56 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2014641392_apwaxgrdomesticpartnerships1stldwritethru.html.
254. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 569 (“Generally, so long as the couple’s relationship would
not violate the strong public policy expressed in the criminal law of its state of domicile, the
marriage is valid for U.S. immigration purposes.” (emphasis added)). This principle has been
applied to states with antimiscegenation, consanguinity, and age-of-consent laws. Id. at 565–75.
255. See supra text accompanying note 76.
256. This does not mean that the state would have to recognize the marriage under its laws.
See Strasser, supra note 252, at 418.
257. Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 442 (B.I.A. 1967) (denying recognition of a legal marriage
performed in South Carolina between first cousins because they violated Wisconsin’s statutory
provisions criminalizing first-cousin marriages and the evasion of its marriage laws).
258. Id.
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such laws to make sure that their public policy against so-called
same-sex marriage is not circumvented. This may require some
couples to move in order to receive immigration rights.
Assuming that there is no criminal prohibition of marriage
between individuals of the same-sex or of the evasion of marriage
laws, states will not have a strong enough public policy exception to
change the “valid where celebrated” rule for purposes of the INA.
Thus, legally married same-sex binational couples would likely be
eligible for spousal sponsorship under the INA regardless of where
they are domiciled. Of course, all of this is only possible in a postDOMA world. If DOMA remains law, same-sex binational couples
will continue to be denied family-unification unless some legislative
action is taken.
VI. UAFA AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION
If DOMA is not repealed or overturned, same-sex binational
couples must look elsewhere to achieve immigration equality. One
solution is the Uniting American Families Act (UAFA), which adds
a new category of “permanent partner” to family-based
immigration.259 The UAFA has been introduced in Congress as a
stand-alone bill, but it is also being discussed as a necessary piece of
any comprehensive immigration reform.260 Even if the UAFA is
passed in some form, same-sex binational couples will not be treated
as equal to opposite-sex couples under the current language of the
bill. This part explores UAFA’s drafting pitfalls and possible
resolutions.
A. History of the Bill
In February 2000, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York
first introduced the Permanent Partners Immigration Act in the
House of Representatives.261 Three years later, Senator Patrick Leahy

259. Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United States
Immigration Law as Applied to Bi-national Same-sex Couples: Making the Case for the Uniting
American Families Act, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 319 (2009).
260. Rep. Mike Honda, Immigration Reform Makes Cents, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2011 4:40 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48697.html.
261. Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2000, H.R. 3650, 106th Cong. (2000), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR03650:.
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of Vermont introduced a sister bill in the Senate.262 In 2005, both
bills were renamed as the Uniting American Families Act.263 The
UAFA’s purpose is to amend the INA to allow U.S. citizens and
LPRs to sponsor their permanent partners.264 In other words, it
purports to provide same-sex binational couples with the same
spousal sponsorship rights that opposite-sex married couples receive
without requiring the same-sex couples to be married. Providing
these rights, however, will require passage of the bill, which is far
from likely in the 112th Congress.265
While the UAFA may not pass as a stand-alone bill, it is also
included in more comprehensive reforms of family-based
immigration. Representative Mike Honda of California introduced
the Reuniting Families Act on August 19, 2009.266 The bill is meant
to generally promote family unity in immigration by alleviating the
long wait times for families of LPRs (by making them exempt from
quotas) and decreasing other measures that prevent family members
from obtaining visas.267 Further, by incorporating the UAFA, the bill
“eliminates discrimination in immigration law” against same-sex
couples.268 As part of comprehensive immigration reform, the bill has
a broader coalition of immigrant and civil rights groups supporting it
than the UAFA alone has.269 The largest problem for same-sex
binational couples is that the Reuniting Families Act’s sister bill in
262. Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2003, S. 1510, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:S01510:.
263. Golden, supra note 259, at 319.
264. Id.
265. All cosponsors of the UAFA proposed in 2009 were Democrats. See H.R. 1024
Cosponsors, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01024:@
@@P (last visited Nov. 5, 2010); S. 424 Cosponsors, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00424:@@@P (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). The
House of the 112th Congress is controlled by a Republican majority, making it unlikely that a bill
sponsored only by Democrats will pass. Alan Silverleib, supra note 91. The Senate in 2009 held
its first hearing on the UAFA, but only four senators attended, which demonstrates the weak
support for passage. Matt Graham, UAFA Senate Hearing, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
(June 4, 2009), http://www.cis.org/Graham/UAFAHearing.
266. Reuniting Families Act of 2009, H.R. 2709, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.2709:.
267. Reuniting Families Act, supra note 38.
268. Id.
269. Kerry Eleveld, Reuniting Families Act Introduced, ADVOCATE (June 4, 2009),
http://www.advocate.com/article.aspx?id=78468. Rep. Honda also thinks that the bill can appeal
to his Republican colleagues because of the fiscal impact of broader reform. Honda, supra note
260.
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the Senate does not include the UAFA language.270 So, same-sex
binational couples may be left out of comprehensive immigration
reform.
While the political prospects of the UAFA and the Reuniting
Families Act remain uncertain, as long as DOMA remains law, these
bills provide the only hope for same-sex families wishing to remain
together in the United States. The rest of this part analyzes the bill’s
goals for equal family unification (assuming it is passed in its current
version) and the requirements that make it fall short of those aims.
B. Text of the UAFA
If the UAFA (or the House version of the Reuniting Families
Act) becomes law, it would allow gay and lesbian U.S. citizens and
LPRs to sponsor their “permanent partner[s]” for green cards, in the
same manner that opposite-sex spouses do. The bill amends the INA
and defines a permanent partner as:
[A]n individual 18 years of age or older who—
(A) is in a committed, intimate relationship with another
individual 18 years of age or older in which both parties
intend a lifelong commitment;
(B) is financially interdependent with that other individual;
(C) is not married to or in a permanent partnership with
anyone other than that other individual;
(D) is unable to contract with that other individual a
marriage cognizable under this Act; and
(E) is not a first, second, or third degree blood relation of
that other individual.271
Once all of these requirements are met, a gay or lesbian’s permanent
partner will be treated like a “spouse” under the INA.272
Despite concerns,273 the UAFA would not be any more
susceptible to fraud than current spousal sponsorship is. A same-sex
couple will have to prove a bona fide relationship through documents
270. Reuniting Families Act, S. 1085, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.1085:.
271. Uniting American Families Act of 2009, H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
272. The bill adds the words “permanent partner” after the term “spouse” throughout the INA.
Id.
273. Opponents of the UAFA contend that the bill will open the door to immigration fraud.
Graham, supra note 265.
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with the same burden of proof that opposite-sex married couples
have.274 The U.S. citizen or LPR who is sponsoring his or her partner
will have to commit to financial support—just like opposite-sex
couples have to do.275 Even the same criminal penalties apply for
immigration fraud and abuse.276 On its face, the law purports to
provide gays and lesbians with an equal opportunity to sponsor their
loved ones for family-based immigration. However, there are
obstacles within the bill for same-sex binational couples—namely,
meeting the bill’s requirements and their interaction with DOMA.
C. Marriage Cognizable Under the Act:
Interpreting for Consistency
The UAFA tries to avoid a conflict with DOMA by limiting its
application to couples “unable to contract . . . a marriage cognizable
under [the INA].”277 Same-sex couples are the intended beneficiaries
of this new category since their marriages are currently not
cognizable under the INA—because of DOMA. When the UAFA
was originally proposed in 2000, no state performed marriage
between same-sex individuals. Now there are seven jurisdictions
doing so, and there are also several court challenges to DOMA. Both
of these new developments create asymmetrical rights and make the
“unable to contract . . . a marriage cognizable under [the INA]”
requirement complex to apply.
1. Asymmetrical Rights Are Created
If a couple like de Leon and Beddingfield is legally married in
Washington, D.C., can the spouses still apply for permanent partner
sponsorship? They are married, but because of DOMA their marriage
is not cognizable under federal law. It seems that they fit the
UAFA’s criteria. This interpretation would allow the bill to apply in
today’s world to married same-sex couples, but it would create
inequality for opposite-sex couples. Permanent partnerships only
apply to couples that cannot get married under federal law. Oppositesex couples are able to get married and are thus unable to form

274.
275.
276.
277.

Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 573.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 271.
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permanent partnerships under the INA. In jurisdictions that recognize
marriages between same-sex individuals, members of same-sex
binational couples, whether they are married or not, would be able to
sponsor their partners or spouses, but opposite-sex couples would
only be given the same benefit if they choose to marry. This would
treat couples differently based on gender and could be a Fifth
Amendment equal protection issue.278
Another asymmetrical rights structure would exist if DOMA
were only partially struck down. For example, DOMA could be
struck down only in the First Circuit for a period of time,279 while the
Congress could pass the UAFA to benefit people in other circuits.
Under this scenario, marriages of same-sex couples in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire would be recognized in their state and under
federal law, so those couples could not apply for permanent
partnerships. However, marriages of same-sex couples in Vermont
and Washington, D.C., would not be recognized federally, so those
couples could apply for permanent partnerships. This would create
an incoherent patchwork where members of same-sex binational
couples in Vermont, whether they are married or not, could sponsor
their partners or spouses, but similar couples in Massachusetts would
only be given the same benefit if they choose to marry. The federal
government would then be treating couples differently based on
where they live—another potential equal protection issue.280
If DOMA were repealed or struck down nationwide, an
asymmetrical rights issue would not exist, but the UAFA would be
superfluous.281 This means that Congress would not likely pass the
UAFA in a post-DOMA world. It is possible, however, that the
UAFA could pass and that DOMA could then be repealed or
overturned sometime later.282 This would implicate the interpretation
278. However, the government could argue that there is an important interest for the gender
disparity—remedying past discrimination. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (finding
that reduction in past disparity because of gender is an important governmental objective). The
ultimate outcome of such a case is beyond the scope of this Article.
279. This assumes that the First Circuit affirms Gill or Mass. v. HHS and the Supreme Court
denies certiorari.
280. Since no suspect classification or fundamental right is at stake, the Court would likely
only apply rational basis review. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 74, at 719–23.
281. In a post-DOMA world, same-sex married couples would likely have equal family-based
immigration rights. See discussion supra Part IV.
282. If the UAFA were law and DOMA was repealed later, there would be administrative
issues to consider. Some same-sex binational couples may have already applied for permanent
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problem—what does it mean to be unable to contract a cognizable
marriage?
2. When Is a Couple Unable to Contract Marriage?
If DOMA is repealed after the UAFA is in place, marriages
between same-sex individuals would become cognizable under the
INA. Couples that can marry are not able to be permanent partners.
Does this mean that same-sex couples in states that prohibit so-called
same-sex marriage, like Texas,283 are “unable to contract . . . a
marriage cognizable under [the INA]”? Without DOMA, same-sex
couples in states like Texas may still be able to get married in
Massachusetts and then have their marriage recognized under the
INA.284 On the other hand, if the state criminally prohibits the
evasion of its marriage laws, the couple may not be able to contract a
marriage.
The law would be unclear on what obstacles make the couple
unable to contract a marriage. Would it be sufficient that the couple
has to travel out of state or would they need to be subject to some
criminal prohibition? Some guidance from Congress or an
interpretation of the UAFA by the BIA would be necessary. A
narrow interpretation of the UAFA could lead to different treatment
federally depending on where one lives, but deference to state law
may be a rational basis for such distinction. Assuming the broadest
interpretation, Texas couples would likely be considered unable to
contract a marriage. Then same-sex binational couples in Texas (and
in other states where so-called same-sex marriage is not allowed)
could apply for family-based immigration as permanent partners.
3. Remove the Requirement in Order to Broaden the Bill
To avoid these interpretation problems and possible
asymmetrical rights issues, the best fix is to eliminate the UAFA’s
partnership, but now they could in theory apply for a green card as a spouse. Since there are
different requirements for permanent partners and spouses, some administrative measure would
be necessary to change the application. One solution could be some form of “upgrade” to the
sponsorship petitions. See Glossary of Visa Terms: Upgrade a Petition, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/glossary/glossary_1363.html#upgradepetition (last visited Apr. 9,
2011).
283. See Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77.
284. This of course depends on the state’s public policy and potential criminal prohibitions in
regard to marriage. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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restrictive language altogether. This would take care of the problem
of interpreting who is “unable to contract” in today’s world, where
marriages between same-sex individuals are performed, and what is
“cognizable” in a post-DOMA world.
Yet the benefits go beyond that. Striking out the language would
mean that even opposite-sex couples could apply for permanent
partnerships. This serves two purposes. First, this may increase
support behind the UAFA by making it no longer about same-sex
couples but more generally about family unification. Second, this
would recognize the changing family structure in the United States.
For example, as of the 2000 census, unmarried cohabitating partners
formed nearly four million households.285 Expanding permanent
partnerships to some of these couples (that may be binational) would
also bring U.S. family unification policy closer to those of our
international allies.286 In all, eliminating the unable-to-contract-amarriage requirement would provide a more consistent application of
the rights granted by the bill—whether or not DOMA is law.
D. Financial Interdependence: Problems and Solutions
Separate from the unable-to-contract-a-marriage requirement
discussed above, the UAFA’s financial-interdependence requirement
for a permanent partnership is particularly problematic for same-sex
binational couples. The requirement that a permanent partner be
“financially interdependent with that other individual”287 seems to be
modeled after state domestic partnership laws. But binational

285. There are 3.8 million, but that number is likely undercounted. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE
M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
MARCH 2000, at 12 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf. For
a further discussion on responding to the growth of nonmarital cohabitation see Thomas P.
Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 LAW & INEQ. 291 (2010).
286. See generally Bonnie Miluso, Note, Family “De-unification” in the United States:
International Law Encourages Immigration Reform for Same-Gender Binational Partners, 36
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 915 (2004) (providing examples of nations that have incorporated
same-gender partner immigration rights into their legal structures). For example, Canada provides
three avenues for a citizen to sponsor a partner (whether same-sex or opposite-sex): as a spouse,
as a common-law partner, or as a conjugal partner. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN.,
IMMIGRATION CANADA: SPONSORSHIP OF A SPOUSE, COMMON-LAW PARTNER, CONJUGAL
PARTNER OR DEPENDENT CHILD LIVING OUTSIDE CANADA 3 (2010), available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/3999E.pdf. The United Kingdom does not recognize
marriages of same-sex couples, but it has allowed immigration for same-sex couples through the
“Unmarried Partners Rule.” Miluso, supra, at 931.
287. See supra text accompanying note 271.
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relationships—often requiring the partners to live oceans apart— are
inherently different from domestic relationships, where both persons
are U.S. citizens. Also, no such financial-interdependence
requirement is imposed on opposite-sex couples, so it is not clear
what the requirement entails and how binational couples are able to
satisfy it. Removing this requirement or expanding fiancé visas are
possible solutions to assure that the UAFA’s goals are achievable for
all same-sex binational couples.
1. Defining Financial Interdependence
The UAFA never defines what it means to be financially
interdependent with the other individual,288 and the requirement is
neither mentioned nor defined in the INA itself.289 If the plain
meaning rule were followed,290 financial interdependence would be
interpreted to roughly mean reliance between two people for
financial support.291 This reliance could be proved “by submitting
evidence of a joint bank account, and shared responsibility (e.g. both
names on statements) for credit cards, utilities, rent, and the like.”292
Many domestic laws and policies support this explanation. Some
states have similar financial interdependence language within their
domestic partnership laws,293 and businesses often require a
comparable showing of financial interdependence for a gay or
lesbian employee’s same-sex partner to receive company benefits.294
Thus, the remainder of this part assumes that the UAFA drafters
288. See H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. (2009).
289. A Westlaw search of 8 U.S.C. for “finan! interdep!” and “financially interdependent”
obtained zero results. President Obama even acknowledges that the language is vague and needs
to be more specific. Timothy R. Carraher, Note, Some Suggestions for the UAFA: A Bill for
Same-Sex Binational Couples, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 150, 164 (2009).
290. The plain meaning rule states that courts should interpret statutory language, if possible,
under its plain meaning. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of
the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.”).
291. This definition was formed by combining the definitions of “inter” and “dependence.”
See MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 334 (11th ed. 2008).
292. Uniting American Families Act, NAT’L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS., n.2
http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_federallegislation_uafa#footnote2
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
293. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-1(3) (2010).
294. Raymond C. O’Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 181 (1995).
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intend to require a showing of financial support through factors like
bank accounts and rent.
2. Achieving Interdependence
Is Inherently Difficult for Binational Couples
The problem with such a definition of the financialinterdependence requirement is that what may work for domestic law
will not necessarily achieve similar results when it is applied on an
international level. Given the current state of the law, many members
of binational couples—like Sandra and her Hungarian partner—are
forced to live apart.295 When they are not living together, it is difficult
(if not impossible) for them to have shared responsibilities for rent
and utilities. The option may exist for them to open an international
bank account, but it is not clear if that would be sufficient to show
that they rely on each other for support. If members of same-sex
binational couples are unable to obtain financial interdependence,
they cannot be united under the UAFA, as the requirement is a
prerequisite to a permanent partnership.
It seems that the UAFA drafters may have thought they fixed
this by extending “conditional permanent resident status” to
permanent partners.296 However, this provision falls short. It is really
about proving the bona fides of a marriage (or permanent
partnership).297 It will not assist members of same-sex binational
couples in achieving financial interdependence because conditional
status is granted only after a permanent partnership is formed. It
seems unlikely that members of binational couples (who are likely
living apart) who have been together less than two years would
already be financially interdependent, so obtaining a permanent
partnership would be difficult (if not impossible).
If the couple is together in the United States, problems with
financial interdependence still arise. The problem is so-called
immigrant intent. All non-immigrant visas require the alien to not
295. See supra text accompanying note 14.
296. Under the INA currently, if an alien has been married to an opposite-sex spouse for less
than two years, he or she is given a green card on a conditional basis. INA § 216, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186a (2006). At the end of the two years, if the couple is still married, the alien is granted
lawful permanent residence after another immigration interview. Id. This same conditional status
under the UAFA is given to permanent partnerships under two years. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong.
§ 12 (2009).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 305–06.
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intend to stay in the United States permanently,298 and the burden is
on the alien to prove this.299 Opening a bank account with a U.S.
citizen could be evidence of the alien’s intent to stay and thus could
violate his or her current visa. It would be problematic (and even
ironic) for a same-sex couple to try to meet the UAFA’s requirement
and at the same time violate the INA. There is a potential solution of
so-called dual intent,300 but that is only expressly recognized for
certain nonimmigrant categories like temporary workers.301 Another
process—adjustment of status302—could also be helpful, but that
process is discretionary303 so preconceived intent may be enough to
deny adjustment. In all, members of same-sex binational couples,
whether they live apart or together, are going to have many
difficulties proving so-called financial interdependence and,
therefore, achieving a permanent partnership under the UAFA.
3. Added Requirement
Creates Asymmetrical Rights
Besides being difficult to achieve, the financial-interdependence
requirement, like the unable-to-contract-a-marriage requirement,
creates an asymmetrical rights structure between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. Here, the same-sex couples are the ones who
must meet an additional requirement before they receive immigration
benefits. Opposite-sex spouses are not required to show that they are
financially interdependent with each other in order to qualify for
298. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 400.
299. Id.; INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b).
300. If the alien has the intent from the beginning to remain permanently in the United States,
he or she is not a bona fide nonimmigrant and likely violating his or her visa. ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 400. On the other hand, the BIA has found that a person’s desire to remain in
the United States, should an opportunity present itself legally, is not necessarily inconsistent with
nonimmigrant status. Chryssikos v. Comm’r of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1924);
Hosseinpour, 15 I. & N. Dec. 191, 192 (B.I.A. 1975).
301. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 400. Dual intent is essentially recognized by
the 1990 Immigration Act for most temporary workers (H, L, O and P visa categories). 2
GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 12.03[1][c], at 12–19 to –20, § 20.06[3],
at 20–21 to –23, § 20.13[8], at 20–153 to –154, § 25.01[3], at 25–6 to –8.
302. Under the INA, nonimmigrants who meet certain criteria are able to adjust their status to
an LPR without having to travel overseas to obtain the green card from a consular office. INA
§ 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 656–57. Adjustment of status
can also provide relief from removal proceedings. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The
UAFA expressly adds “permanent partnership” after “marriage” and “spouse” in these provisions
of the INA. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 16–17 (2009).
303. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
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sponsorship.304 On the other hand, commingling of finances is often a
primary way of proving the bona fides of a marriage.305 The
commingling presumably happens after the marriage, and courts use
it to look at the couple’s intent at time of marrying.306 In other words,
same-sex couples would be required to show commingling of
finances in order to obtain family-based immigration, but oppositesex couples would only need to demonstrate the same if the validity
of the marriage were in question. To remove this inequality some fix
is necessary.
4. Solution: Extending Fiancé Visas
Opposite-sex couples have the option of obtaining fiancé visas.
This could be the solution to provide equality between spouses and
permanent partners and also give same-sex couples time to achieve
financial interdependence. Though the INA only extends green cards
to spouses (permanent or conditional), it does allow a fiancé of a
U.S. citizen to enter the United States on a K-1 visa, as a
nonimmigrant, in order to enter into a marriage.307
The UAFA would not add permanent partnerships to K-1 visas,
but only to K-2 visas.308 Therefore, under the UAFA, a gay or lesbian
alien can enter the United States after his or her permanent
partnership has been created with a U.S. citizen—meaning after
financial interdependence is proved. If the UAFA were to add
permanent partners to the K-1 visa, members of gay and lesbian
couples who are living apart could come together in the United
States for ninety days. In those ninety days, the couple would then be
able to take the necessary steps to prove financial interdependence.309

304. See Immigrant Visas for Spouses of a U.S. Citizen (IR1 or CR1), TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_2991.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
305. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1685 (2007).
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
308. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (“Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (15)(K)(ii), by inserting ‘or permanent partnership’ after ‘marriage’ . . . .”). The
K-2 visa only allows a spouse (or permanent partner under the UAFA) to enter the United States
after the marriage is performed, while awaiting approval of the petition for sponsorship. INA
§ 101(a)(15)(K)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(ii).
309. They could open bank accounts, sign joint lease agreements, add the alien to utility bills,
etc.
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The likely opposition to this proposal is a claim of fraud, but
there is no evidence that same-sex couples would be more fraudulent
than opposite-sex couples are. In fact, if this change were to be made
in the UAFA, then same-sex couples would be subject to the same
deportation proceedings that opposite-sex couples face if they do not
take the necessary steps within the ninety-day period.310 Without the
addition of a K-1 visa for members of same-sex binational couples
living apart, it is unclear how they could ever prove financial
interdependence, and therefore achieve a permanent partnership.
5. Solution: Remove the Requirement
A more direct solution to the problems of satisfying the
financial-interdependence requirement and the asymmetrical system
that it encourages would be to remove the requirement altogether.
Many may object, but the language is superfluous to achieving the
bill’s goals. One concern with the current INA sponsorship scheme is
preventing the admission of aliens who are likely to become a
“public charge.”311 The UAFA already addresses this concern
(mirroring all other family sponsorship avenues) by requiring the
sponsoring partner to complete an affidavit of support.312 The other
goal of the financial-interdependence requirement could be that it
constitutes proof of a committed relationship, the same way that it is
used in domestic laws.313 A marriage license acts as proof for
opposite-sex couples, so this requirement may be the proof for samesex couples. Of course, there are multiple jurisdictions that now give
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, so that reasoning cannot work
in those places.314 Regardless, the UAFA, even without this
requirement, already requires a committed relationship explicitly, or
it could easily be modified in other ways to do so. Per the UAFA,
only conditional residence is granted for a partnership of less than

310. The UAFA would need to add permanent partners to INA § 214(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1184(d)(1) (“In the event the marriage . . . does not occur within three months after the
admission . . . , [the alien] shall be required to depart from the United States and upon failure to
do so shall be removed . . . .”).
311. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
312. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 1183a(f)(1).
313. See supra notes 293–94.
314. The requirement may have been applicable when the UAFA was proposed in 2000, but
now it seems to be a remnant of the past.
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two years.315 If the partnership has lasted more than two years,
instead of looking only at financial interdependence, immigration
officials could look to the same bona fides that they consider for
opposite-sex marriages.316 The goals of the financial interdependence
prerequisite therefore are already met, or could be met, without
adding a substantial obstacle for same-sex binational couples to
overcome.
The approach for determining the existence of a permanent
partnership under the UAFA should be an overall assessment of the
relationship, with financial interdependence being one factor but not
a requirement. If it remains a requirement, many of the people who
the UAFA is trying to help may be ineligible for family-based
sponsorship. In other words, the UAFA—in its current form—might
not be as equal as it purports to be.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Representative Jerrold Nadler said, “We . . . strengthen our
communities—and our nation—by encouraging loving couples and
families to stay together . . . .”317 However, more than thirty-six
thousand families—like Tan’s and de Leon’s—are unable to remain
together legally in the United States simply because they are gay or
lesbian. This is because of DOMA. A solution is necessary to
prevent these families from choosing among separation, exile, or
breaking the law.
The UAFA extends family-based immigration to gays and
lesbians, while avoiding the DOMA marriage restriction. But its
requirements are unequal and difficult (if not impossible, given the
current law) for binational couples to achieve. Equality in name and
function is only possible with the end of DOMA. A legislative repeal
is not immediately likely, so same-sex couples must turn to the
federal courts for relief. Gill and Mass. v. HHS lay the groundwork
for same-sex binational couples to challenge DOMA’s application to

315. See supra note 296.
316. See supra text accompanying note 241. Another option to prove commitment could be to
look at cohabitation, but, then again, that is a problem for couples who are forced to live apart
because of the current law.
317. Press Release, Representative Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Nadler Continues the Fight for LGBT
Immigrant Rights (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny08_nadler/UAFA_
021209.html.
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immigration. With the DOJ’s new stance on the unconstitutionality
of DOMA, a successful challenge is more likely than ever before.
The Perry litigation also provides many legal avenues for same-sex
couples to build a successful DOMA challenge, especially if
marriage is declared a fundamental right for all couples regardless of
their gender (or sexual orientation). If DOMA were no longer law,
same-sex binational couples would be steps away from immigration
equality. There may be obstacles, but this Article illuminates a path
to immigration equality in a post-DOMA world.
While it is uncertain when DOMA will end or if comprehensive
immigration reform will include same-sex binational families, it is
clear that families and family law in the United States are changing
rapidly. As President Obama acknowledged, it is “clear where the
trendlines are going.”318 If the United States adheres to its policy of
making family unification a cornerstone of immigration, soon the
“arc of history”319 may include same-sex binational families.

318. Sudbay, supra note 82.
319. Id.
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